Ohio Northern University Law Review
Volume 45

Issue 1

Article 12

2018

Speculations on Criminal Justice Mechanisms to Address the
North Korean Regime's Human Rights Violations: ICC, Ad Hoc
Tribunals, or Something Else?
Yun Ju Kang

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.onu.edu/onu_law_review
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the International Humanitarian Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Kang, Yun Ju (2018) "Speculations on Criminal Justice Mechanisms to Address the North Korean
Regime's Human Rights Violations: ICC, Ad Hoc Tribunals, or Something Else?," Ohio Northern University
Law Review: Vol. 45: Iss. 1, Article 12.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.onu.edu/onu_law_review/vol45/iss1/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the ONU Journals and Publications at
DigitalCommons@ONU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Ohio Northern University Law Review by an
authorized editor of DigitalCommons@ONU. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@onu.edu.

Kang: Speculations on Criminal Justice Mechanisms to Address the North

Speculations on Criminal Justice Mechanisms to Address the
North Korean Regime’s Human Rights Violations: ICC, Ad Hoc
Tribunals, or Something Else?*
YUN JU KANG**
ABSTRACT
The international community calls for the implementation of criminal
justice measures to ensure accountability for human rights violators in North
Korea. In 2014, the UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) found a wide range of
human rights violations in North Korea and recommended two criminal
justice options: a Security Council referral to the ICC, or the establishment
of an ad-hoc tribunal. However, criticisms of feasibility and efficiency of
both options demand broader study of the use of criminal justice options
beyond the UN’s recommendations. Thus, this article evaluates different
organizational and institutional choices of criminal justice starting with the
ICC and ad hoc tribunals, and expanding the examination to mixed tribunals,
domestic courts, and local justice. Each option has different merits and
weaknesses, and preferences may change at times. Based on an examination
of each option, the recommendation is to use mixed tribunals or
complementary court options as measures to deal with North Korea’s
transitional justice.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to evaluate different criminal accountability
options and suggest the measures best suited to the future Korea. This article
examines the case of North Korea and evaluates its criminal accountability
options first by exploring the importance of acknowledging criminal
accountability, and then selecting the most fitting accountability measures.
In light of North Korea’s systematic and egregious human rights violations,
one of the essential issues in a post-conflict transition is criminal
accountability; this imperative requires an institutional and an organizational
choice. Thus, the first section of this paper discusses criminal accountability
and institutional choices. The second section, explains the legal principles of
criminal accountability and examines the human rights violations in North
Korea in order to establish the necessity of criminal accountability measures
in the post-conflict era. The third section analyzes factors that should be
considered when creating a basis for selecting appropriate tools among
accountability measures, such as the characteristics of each court and the
context of transition. To analyze each option, the next section provides
hypothetical situations of transition as the context for envisaging a future
criminal justice setting in North Korea. The fourth section evaluates different
options for implementing criminal accountability measures such as the ICC,
ad hoc tribunals, mixed tribunals, domestic courts, and local justice measures
for North Korea in its post-conflict justice setting. The last section of this
article suggests the most-fitting criminal accountability measure for a future
Korea in order to deal with the North Korean regime’s extensive human rights
violations.
2. CRIMINAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND INSTITUTIONAL AND
ORGANIZATIONAL CHOICE
2.1. Criminal Accountability in Transitional Justice
The world is experiencing a rapid increase in the number of societies
addressing the legacy of massive human rights violations and such societies
are developing mechanisms to ensure that the violators are held accountable.1
It is no longer considered appropriate to grant impunity by political settlement
to those who bear responsibility for atrocities.2 Transitional justice, or post1. See Neil J. Kritz, Progress and Humility: The Ongoing Search for Post-Conflict Justice, in
POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE 55, 55 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2002); See Benjamin N. Schiff, Do Truth
Commissions Promote Accountability or Impunity? The Case of the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE 325, 325 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2002).
2. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Accountability for Violations of International Humanitarian Law and
Other Serious Violations of Human Rights, in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE 3, 3 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed.,
2002).
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conflict justice, is a set of mechanisms put into place which demand
accountability, seek redress for victims, promote human rights, and prevent
recurrence of the tragic past.3 Addressing the accountability issue is at the
center of transitional justice because it is the start of seeking justice and
confronting problems. 4 “Accountability measures fall into three [main]
categories: truth, justice, and redress.” 5 Accountability measures in
transitional justice include criminal prosecution, criminal investigatory
commissions, truth commissions, amnesty, lustration, civil remedies, and
reparations for victims. 6 Societies select one or a combination of these
measures in order to seek accountability depending on their transitional
justice objects and context.7
Criminal accountability is considered one of the main tools among
accountability measures.8 Criminal accountability is defined as “the process
whereby human rights perpetrators are held responsible for their misdeeds
through identifying the crime and the perpetrator, holding fair and free trials,
and meting out punishment in accordance with the crime committed.”9 The
international community defined international crimes and uses criminal
prosecution to meet the demands of accountability by establishing
international criminal tribunals.10 It is not always necessary to have criminal
justice to achieve the transitional justice; however, criminal justice is
considered a prerequisite to the rule of law, and it is the beginning of the
current consensus on transitional justice implementation. 11 The aims of
international criminal justice are retribution, deterrence, incapacitation,
rehabilitation, education, justice for victims, truth-telling, and post-conflict
reconciliation. 12 Using international criminal justice to hold violators
accountable expresses the outrage of the community and penalizes serious
human rights violations by imposing retribution.13 The prosecution of the
responsible individuals brings individual deterrence, and it also prevents
reoccurrence.14 It allows a chance of rehabilitation to lower level offenders
3. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & DANIEL ROTHENBERG, THE CHICAGO PRINCIPLES ON POSTCONFLICT JUSTICE, 2, 4-5 (2007).
4. Id. at 2.
5. See Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 26.
6. See id. at 27.
7. See id. at 39-40.
8. See Nenad Demitrijević, Entries on Transitional Justice Methods, Processes, and Practices, in
1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 1, 8 (Lavinia Stan & Nadya Nedelsky eds., 2013)
9. Elin Skaar, Entries on Transitional Justice Concepts and Terms, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 280, 280 (Lavinia Stan & Nadya Nedelsky eds., 2013).
10. See Demitrijević, supra note 8, at 8.
11. See id.; see also Skaar, supra note 9, 280.
12. See W.J. VAN DER WOLF, PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES BY
NATIONAL COURTS, 52-53, 56, 61-63, 65, 67, 71 (2011)
13. Id. at 53-54.
14. Id. at 56-57.
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and contributes to restorative justice.15 Prosecution further educates society
about unacceptable conduct and can recover trust in the rule of law.16 It brings
justice to victims by allowing them to participate in reparation efforts and
punishing perpetrators.17 The court procedure creates a narrative that helps
post-conflict society through truth-telling 18 and the facilitation of
reconciliation and durable peace.19
Criminal accountability options include international prosecutions,
national prosecutions, and a mixed model.20 International prosecutions are
available in a few settings; one such setting is the International Criminal
Court (ICC), which is the permanent international criminal court, the major
international enforcement mechanism of international criminal law. Another
setting is ad hoc international tribunals to deal with specific events or
regions. 21 National prosecution using already existing domestic criminal
court system is the other option to deal with past atrocities and pursue
accountability.22 At the national level, a special domestic tribunal may be
established to deal with post-conflict issues or a local justice measures can be
chosen as a tool to realize transitional justice. 23 There is an increasing
recognition of indigenous or informal, tradition-based methods for
administering justice using the local justice measures.24 Domestic courts of a
foreign country may also be a venue for accountability exercising universal
jurisdiction.25 The mixed or hybrid model is a new type of accountability
measure which entails cooperation between international and domestic actors
to overcome the weakness of one side’s involvement and complement the
criminal accountability procedure.26

15. Id. at 62.
16. Id. at 63-64.
17. VAN DER WOLF, supra note 12, at 65-66, 67.
18. Id. at 67.
19. Id. at 71.
20. See Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 26.
21. See id. at 4-5
22. See Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 33 (noting contexts where national/domestic prosecution may
be appropriate).
23. VAN DER WOLF, supra note 12, at 126.
24. Dustin N. Sharp, Transitional Justice and ‘Local’ Justice, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 142, 144 (Cheryl Lawther et al. eds., 2017).
25. Id. at 4.
26. Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT’L. L. 295, 295 (2003).
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2.2. Importance of Criminal Justice Institutional and Organizational
Choice
The usage of international, domestic, and mixed courts to deal with
international crimes is a new phenomenon.27 The first international criminal
court, established following the Cold War, gave way to the creation of
international human rights norms.28 The design of the international criminal
court changed over time to meet the demands of international justice, causing
international criminal law and its principles to evolve with this change.29 The
new styles of mixed form, internationalized-domestic courts, and purely
domestic courts adopting international norms of justice have emerged as part
of this international institutional evolution.30
The State affected by international crimes and severe human rights
violations must make critical choices in regard to using existing international
criminal justice measures and adopting or creating new criminal justice
institutions. 31 The choices an institution may make to deal with serious
human rights violations in the past is part of the process called “transitional
justice” in international human rights law studies. 32 Transitional justice
refers to a full range of mechanisms that respond to systemic and widespread
past human rights violations.33 These include criminal prosecution, truthseeking, reparation, institutional reform, and memorialization.34 Transitional
justice consists of both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms to deal with past
human rights violations, and criminal justice is one of its essential
components. 35 Transitional justice aims to establish accountability and
realize justice to lead society on a different trajectory.36 It responds to the
needs and aspirations of a society during the time of transition by playing a
significant role in restoring human rights and justice. 37 The outcome of
transitional justice is greatly affected by institutional and organizational
27. Karen J. Alter, The Evolution of International Law and Courts, 3 ICOURTS WORKING PAPER
SERIES 1, 3 (2014).
28. Id. at 6; Karen J. Alter, The Evolution of International Law and Courts, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM 590, 595 (Orfeo Fioretos et al. eds., 2016).
29. Alter, supra note 28, at 3; Alter, supra note 29, at 590.
30. Alter, supra note 28, at 3; Alter, supra note 29, at 590-91.
31. Alter, supra note 28, at 11, 14, 15-16; Alter, supra note 29, at 607.
32. RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, 3 (2000).
33. Id. at 217.
34. Roger Duthie, Introduction to TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT: MAKING
CONNECTIONS 18, 18 (Pablo de Greiff & Roger Duthie eds., 2009); see also BASSIOUNI & ROTHENBERG,
supra note 3, at 7.
35. Joanna R. Quinn, The Development of Transitional Justice, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 11, 15 (Cheryl Lawther et al. eds., 2017).
36. BASSIOUNI & ROTHENBERG, supra note 3, at 2.
37. See Aaron Fichtelberg, Transitional Justice and the End of Impunity: Hybrid Tribunals, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 328, 328 (Cheryl Lawther et al. eds., 2017).
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decisions.38 Thus, to design or select a suitable transitional justice system to
carry out criminal prosecution, truth-seeking, reparation, institutional reform,
memorialization, and other actions require a comprehensive institutional
analysis of each of these components.39
To contribute to this institutional analysis, this article analyzes the
criminal prosecution component and speculates on the best-suited
institutional and organizational choice for North Korea’s transition. Criminal
justice institutions and organizations each have different characteristics that
result in different outcomes.40 This research does not aim to suggest that
criminal prosecution is the only or the best choice to drive North Korea’s
process of transitional justice; rather, it is an effort to visualize criminal
prosecution, one of the essential components of transitional justice, as the
grounds for speculating which measures are best suited in the transitional
justice context for the future of North Korea.
This paper describes selecting a criminal justice option as both an
organizational choice and an institutional choice. It is an organizational
choice because it involves creating courts or choosing a venue.41 It is an
institutional choice because choice of law depends on the institution, and the
criminal justice option requires determining jurisdictions by adopting,
selecting, or creating an institution.42
Jurisdiction refers to the “power of a court to adjudicate cases and issue
orders.”43 Relevant to this analysis, jurisdiction can be broken down into
personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, territorial jurisdiction, and
temporal jurisdiction. 44 Personal jurisdiction is a court’s power of
adjudicating cases involving a particular person, which includes in personam
jurisdiction (power directed against a party) and in rem jurisdiction (power
over a property dispute).45 Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the type of
crimes that a court adjudicates, which in the case of criminal law requires
adopting an already existing criminal law or creating a new institution to
define crimes and penalties. 46 Territorial jurisdiction and temporal
38. BASSIOUNI & ROTHENBERG, supra note 3, at 10-11
39. Id. at 7.
40. Id. at 10-11; Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice and Judicial Activism – A Right to
Accountability? 48 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 385, 385, 412 (2015)
41. Casten Stahn, The Geometry of Transitional Justice: Choice of Institutional Design, 18 LEIDEN
J. OF INT’L L. 425, 435 (2005)
42. Id.
43. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1878); Jurisdiction, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/jurisdiction (last visited Nov. 27, 2018).
44. See Hassan Ahmad, Context at the International Criminal Court, 110 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc.
151, 151 (2016).
45. Personal Jurisdiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004); In Rem Jurisdiction,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
46. Subject-matter Jurisdiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
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jurisdiction refer to the territory and time over which the court may exercise
its jurisdiction.47 Thus, the jurisdiction of courts not only decides the scope
of the courts’ power, but also the rights of related individuals.48 They affect
the determination of the victims’ right to make claims and the deprivation of
the accused’s personal rights and property; sometimes this entails substantial
socioeconomic reconstitution, which thereby greatly affects material property
rights.49 The choice of jurisdiction varies among courts.50 For example, the
ICC has temporal jurisdiction over crimes committed after 2002 and subject
matter jurisdiction over the four categories of crimes in the Rome Statute:
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.51
Ad hoc tribunals and mixed courts establish separate jurisdictions to deal with
crimes committed in specific contexts.52 Mixed courts comprise international
and domestic jurisdictions and often try crimes under their domestic law.53
There is no consistency of jurisdictional choice even among courts on the
same level.54 These differences determine the scope of the power a particular
court might have and the rights of the individuals involved, and therefore
have an effect on society.55
3. NECESSITY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE FOR FUTURE KOREA
This section examines whether criminal prosecution is necessary to seek
accountability for human rights violations in North Korea. This can be done
through an analysis of legal principles and weighing the seriousness of the
violations. This analysis determines whether criminal prosecution is
necessary to deal with North Korea’s human rights violations and provides
the basis for the search of the best suited criminal accountability measures for
North Korea moving forward.

47. Territorial Jurisdiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004); see also Ahmad, supra
note 44, at 140-41 (describing temporal jurisdiction as it pertains to the ICC).
48. See Evans v. Or. Short Line R.R. Co., 149 P. 715, 717 (Mont. 1915) (“If a court has no
jurisdiction of the subject of an action, a judgment rendered therein does not adjudicate anything. It does
not bind the parties, nor can it thereafter be made the foundation of any right”).
49. Duthie, supra note 34, at 20 (explaining that property restitution to victims can improve
development for countries in transition); see also Pablo DeGrieff, Articulating the Links Between
Transitional Justice and Development: Justice and Social Integration, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND
DEVELOPMENT MAKING CONNECTIONS 29, 35 (Pablo de Greiff & Roger Duthie eds., 2009) (explaining
how material property deprivation is often a major component of human rights abuses).
50. See BASSIOUNI & ROTHENBERG, supra note 3, at 29.
51. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 1, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
(entered into force on July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute]; see Mark D. Kielsgard, War on the
International Criminal Court, 8 N.Y.C.L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2005).
52. See Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 28.
53. Michael P. Scharf, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, 5 ASIL INSIGHTS 1, 1-2 (2000).
54. GIADA GIRELLI, UNDERSTANDING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, 185 (2017).
55. Id. at 176.
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3.1. Criminal Accountability for Jus Cogens Crimes
International human rights law and international criminal law decree that
jus cogens international crimes and the most responsible perpetrators must be
prosecuted through criminal courts.56 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention
of the Law of Treaties of 1969 explains jus cogens as “a peremptory norm of
general international law,” and it is accepted and “recognized by the
international community of States as a whole.” 57 Jus cogens crimes in
international law are non-derogable.58 The legal obligation and duty of states
to prosecute or extradite arises from the status of such crimes.59 States are
proscribed from granting impunity to the perpetrators of crimes of the jus
cogens character, which include at least four international crimes: genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and torture.60 No statute of limitation
is applicable to such crimes, immunity for leaders cannot be granted, and the
defense of following orders is not an accepted defense .61 Thus, according to
international legal principle, seeking accountability for those crimes by a
criminal court is necessary.62
Moreover, states have the responsibility of truth-seeking and pursuing
accountability by prosecuting those most responsible for large or organized
crimes. 63 Basic human rights treaties in international law, including the
proposed Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against
Humanity and the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhumane or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, obligate the state to impose sentences
and punish such offenses. 64 States have an obligation to prevent future
crimes, thus, seeking accountability for past crimes through criminal
punishment plays an important role in fulfilling that obligation.65 Bassiouni
argues that impunity in international crimes is “a betrayal of our human
56. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 65-66, 74 (1996).
57. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
58. Bassiouni, supra note 56, at 63.
59. Id. at 65.
60. Id. at 66, 68.
61. Id. at 63.
62. Id. at 65-66 (noting that jus cogens crimes are non-derogable and create a duty to prosecute or
extradite for prosecution).
63. See BASSIOUNI & ROTHENBERG, supra note 3, at 16 (stating respectively, “[s]tates shall
prosecute alleged perpetrators of gross violations of human rights and humanitarian law,” and “[s]tates
shall respect the right to truth and encourage formal investigations of past violations by truth commissions
or other bodies.”).
64. Proposed International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Humanity, WASH. U. SCH. L. WHITNEY R. HARRIS WORLD L. INST. CRIMES AGAINST HUMAN. INITIATIVE
art. 8 (Aug. 2010), http://law.wustl.edu/harris/cah/docs/EnglishTreatyFinal.pdf; Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S.
85 (entered into force June 26, 1987).
65. See BASSIOUNI & ROTHENBERG, supra note 3, at 25.
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solidarity with the victims,” and emphasizes redress for victims through the
use of criminal accountability measures.66
While pursuing criminal accountability is significant, criminal
accountability measures are not always necessary to address every level of
human rights violations. 67 Except for the four jus cogens international
crimes, it is left to the discretion of a domestic court to decide whether to
prosecute and punish by means other than the deprivation of liberty, as long
as it is not granting blanket amnesty.68 To pursue reconciliation, a court can
order a substitute punishment such as community service. 69 Bassiouni
explains that, as long as it is not a de facto impunity, it is not necessary to
prosecute every possible accused person, as the people decided to do moving
forward in the case of South Africa. 70 The people’s will to put a past
traumatic event behind by not prosecuting perpetrators at every level should
be a consideration in selecting a transitional justice mechanism. 71
Nevertheless, truth commissions should not be considered a substitute for the
prosecution of perpetrators at higher levels of responsibility for serious
international crimes.72 For at least the four jus cogens crimes impunity is not
acceptable and criminal accountability must be pursued.73
3.2. Human Rights Violations in North Korea and the Necessity of
Criminal Justice
The long-lasting and massive human rights violations in North Korea
compel the necessity of transitional justice. 74 The grave human rights
violations in North Korea have been drawing serious attention from the
international community in recent decades.75 In 2013, the United Nations
Human Rights Council (UNHRC) adopted a resolution and decided to
establish the United Nations (UN) Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights
(COI) in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to investigate the
“systematic, widespread and grave violations of human rights” in North

66. See Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 54.
67. See Bassiouni, supra note 56, at 63.
68. See Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 33-34.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 42-43.
71. Id. at 42.
72. See id. at 32 (noting that in such cases, the findings from the truth commission can rather be a
precursor to criminal prosecution. Truth commissions’ work can reduce the burden of the criminal
prosecution to provide the broader context of an atrocity or other abhorrent crime.)
73. See Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 26, 27.
74. Rep. of the Detailed Findings of the Comm’n of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Kor., at ¶¶ 6-8, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/CRP.1 (Feb. 7, 2014) [hereinafter Detailed
Findings].
75. Id. at ¶ 7.
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Korea.76 As North Korea is not in a wartime situation, establishing the COI
to investigate its human rights situation is a rare case, and it explains how
urgent the international community considered the investigation into North
Korea’s human rights abuses.77 In February 2014, the Commission submitted
its report with findings and recommendations on North Korea’s state of
human rights to the UNHRC.78 The COI report includes the testimony of
around 200 North Korean refugees as witnesses, 80 of whom testified in the
public hearings on the matter.79
The 2014 COI reports provide sufficient, reasonable grounds to support
evidence of rampant general human rights violations and crimes against
humanity in North Korea. 80 The Commission found a wide range of
violations such as: deprivation of religious freedom, restriction of movement,
torture, executions, and enforced disappearances, and it found that some of
these violations constitute crimes against humanity. 81 Two criteria for
determining a crime against humanity are: (1) inhumane acts and (2)
systematic or widespread commission.82 One of the crimes against humanity
that the COI revealed is the operation of political prisons where more than
80,000 to 120,000 political prisoners are currently detained. 83 The
commission also specifies the main perpetrators, those who are accountable
for human rights violations, as
[The officials of] [t]he State Security Department, the Ministry of
People’s Security, the Korean People’s Army, the Office of the
Public Prosecutor, the judiciary and the Workers’ Party of Korea . . .
[who] are acting under the effective control of the [central organs] of
the Workers’ Party of Korea, the National Defence Commission and
the Supreme Leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.84
The finding of crimes against humanity, which are jus cogens crimes, clarifies
the necessity of accountability measures and transitional justice mechanisms
to deal with this issue.85
The Commission found the evidence of the crimes against humanity
established enough to merit soliciting criminal investigation using both
76. See id. at ¶ 1.
77. Id. at ¶ 6.
78. Rep. of the Comm’n of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Kor.,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/63 (Feb. 7, 2014).
79. Detailed Findings, supra note 74, at ¶ 30.
80. Id. at ¶ 1211.
81. Id. at ¶¶ 1211, 1212, 1214, 1215.
82. Id. at ¶ 1025.
83. Id. at ¶ 1062.
84. Detailed Findings, supra note 74, at ¶ 1193.
85. Id. at ¶ 1195.
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domestic and international justice measures.86 The Commission follows the
definition of crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute when
considering whether the crimes found by the Commission can be prosecuted
before the International Criminal Court (ICC).87 Because the definition under
the Rome Statute is narrower than that of international customary law, the
Commission indicates that following the Rome Statute allows prosecution
before another international or domestic court where the international
customary law applies.88 In the report the COI recommends two options,
either “a Security Council referral of North Korea’s situation to the [ICC] or
the establishment of an ad hoc tribunal by the [UN]”.89 From 2014 to 2018,
the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolutions to refer North
Korea’s situation to the ICC following the COI’s recommendation. 90 In
2017, the Group of Independent Experts on Accountability also
recommended member states either the referral of the North Korean case to
the ICC or the establishment of an ad hoc tribunal.91 It should be noted that
the international community urges applying or creating institutions by
referring the case to the ICC or establishing an international tribunal only to
deal with the North Korea case.92
Considering the seriousness of the atrocities committed and the existence
of jus cogens crimes, criminal accountability measures are necessary under
international legal principles.93 To meet the state’s obligation to prosecute
violators of serious human rights violations, the future Korea should not
evade criminal prosecution of the responsible perpetrators nor grant a blanket
amnesty. Thus, in the future, Korea should select and establish criminal
accountability measures to deal with the jus cogens crimes reported by the
COI which include crimes against humanity.94
4. CONSIDERATIONS ON SELECTING CRIMINAL JUSTICE OPTIONS
The following factors should be considered before the process of
selecting a criminal justice method. To find the best-suited option, we should
understand: (1) the different characteristics of each criminal justice option
86. Id. at ¶¶ 1160, 1163, 1164.
87. Id. at ¶ 1026, 320 n.1541.
88. Id.
89. Detailed Findings, supra note 74, at ¶ 1218.
90. G.A. Res. 69/188, ¶ 8, (Dec. 18, 2014); G.A. Res. 70/172, ¶ 10, (Dec. 17, 2015); G.A. Res.
71/202, ¶ 9, (Dec. 19, 2016); G.A. Res. 72/188, ¶ 11, (Dec. 19, 2017); G.A. Res. 73/180, ¶ 12, (Dec. 17,
2018).
91. Rep. of the Grp. of Indep. Experts on Accountability, ¶ 84, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/34/66/Add.1
(Feb. 24, 2017) [hereinafter Rep. of the Grp. Of Indep.].
92. Detailed Findings, supra note 74, at ¶ 1201.
93. Id. at ¶ 1195.
94. Id. at ¶ 1220(p).
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and (2) the transitioning country’s surrounding context.95 In regard to the
first factor, elements of the specific composition of each court setting taken
into account are discussed.96 With regard to the second factor, this article
explains how and why context should be taken into account in the
assessment. 97 Although the context of future Korea cannot be definitely
predicted, the human rights atrocities in North Korea are known, which is one
important context.98 Because the form of the transition is another important
context that impacts the choice of criminal justice measure, this article
introduces hypothetical situations of transition that apply to the analysis to
aid in understanding the background of the impact.99
4.1. Distinct Characteristics of Different Criminal Justice Options
The distinct characteristics of different court systems should be
considered in selecting and designing a judiciary institution for transitional
justice. 100 Due to their nature as an international institution, domestic
institution, or mixed institution, these criminal accountability option possess
particular strengths and limitations. 101 For example, the ICC is a wellestablished judicial system and resource, and its operation is getting more
attention from media and making an impact on the international
community.102 However, it may have less effectiveness and legitimacy than
domestic courts with locals, to whom higher levels of justice administration
might feel distant.103 The ICC is also limited in its capacity to deal efficiently
with a large number of perpetrators, so it cannot effectively support all
aspects of criminal justice. 104 Ad hoc tribunals have a better capacity to
concentrate on one country’s case, but they may also be less effective than
domestic judicial processes where they lack local ownership.105 Domestic
courts may have legitimacy with residents of the country under scrutiny and
effectively make them feel the impact of criminal justice, but they are often
emasculated by politics and existing institutional contexts. 106 Mixed
tribunals may mitigate some problems in the choice between domestic and
95. See BASSIOUNI & ROTHENBERG, supra note 3, at 10, 23.
96. See infra Section 4.1.
97. See infra Section 4.2.
98. Detailed Findings, supra note 74, at ¶ 1160.
99. See infra Section 4.2.2.
100. BASSIOUNI & ROTHENBERG, supra note 3, at 23.
101. Id. at 29-30.
102. Sang-Hyun Song, The Role of the International Criminal Court in Ending Impunity and
Establishing the Rule of Law, 49 UN CHRON. 1, 2 (Dec. 2012), https://unchronicle.un.org/article/roleinternational-criminal-court-ending-impunity-and-establishing-rule-law.
103. BASSIOUNI & ROTHENBERG, supra note 3, at 29.
104. Id. at 6-7, 30.
105. Id. at 6-7.
106. Id. at 8, 10.

https://digitalcommons.onu.edu/onu_law_review/vol45/iss1/12

12

Kang: Speculations on Criminal Justice Mechanisms to Address the North

2019] SPECULATIONS ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE MECHANISMS

81

international options, but they also have some of the same problems as both
options above.107
So far, no empirical studies provide concrete evidence of the different
effect of various criminal accountability measures or a precise list how certain
characteristics affect certain results.108 One reason for the lack of overall
guidelines is that the selection of the criminal justice option, and its result,
greatly depend on the specific context of each country’s case.109 However,
basic elements that affect a court’s result can be derived from various case
analyses. Among standard criteria for assessing the characteristics of each
court option are legitimacy, effectiveness, efficiency, and practicality.110 It
should be noted that these criteria are exclusive of each other but
interrelated.111
Legitimacy
Legitimacy is understood as the court’s right to rule according to its
mandate and also the legal authority recognized by the people’s perception.
Two concepts of legitimacy named respectively normative and sociological
legitimacy.112 Normative legitimacy refers to “the right to rule according to
predefined standards,” and sociological legitimacy refers to “perceptions or
beliefs that an institution has such a right to rule.”113 Normative legitimacy
is the basis that justifies a court’s authority. 114 This legitimacy issue is
important in an international court because its power to adjudicate is newly
created outside of the traditional perception of the State’s sovereign
jurisdiction.115 Langvatn and Squatrito suggest three elements to consider in
deciding the legitimacy of an international criminal court: (1) how it came
into power, (2) its process of exercising power and procedural fairness, and

107. Id. at 29, 30.
108. BASSIOUNI & ROTHENBERG, supra note 3, at 7.
109. Id. at 2.
110. Yuval Shany, Stronger Together? Legitimacy and Effectiveness of International Courts as
Mutually Reinforcing or Undermining Notions, in LEGITIMACY AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS 338, 370
(Nienke Grossman et. al. eds., 2018); see Rama Mani, Dilemmas of Expanding Transitional Justice, or
Forging the Nexus between Transitional Justice and Development, 2 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 253,
256 (2008); see also David Turns, “Internationalized” or Ad Hoc Justice for International Criminal law
in a Time of Transition: The Cases of East Timor, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia, 6 AUSTRIAN
REV. INT’L & EUR. L. 123, 129, 132 (2001).
111. Shany, supra note 110, at 370.
112. Harlan Grant Cohen et al., Legitimacy and International Courts – A Framework, in
LEGITIMACY AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS 1, 4 (Nienke Grossman et al. eds., 2018).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Silje Aambo Langvatn & Theresa Squatrito, Conceptualising and Measuring the Legitimacy
of International Criminal Tribunals, in THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 41,
41 (Nobuo Hayashi & Cecilia M. Bailliet eds., 2017).
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(3) the result produced by the court.116 The court’s jurisdiction is closely
related to the issue of legitimacy and also affects its effectiveness, efficiency,
and practicality.117 The consent of the State and fairness of the procedure
affect the legitimacy of an international court, but its normative goal of justice
and stakeholders’ participation increasingly impact its legitimacy. 118 In a
post-conflict situation, sociological legitimacy and acceptance by the
constituency highly impact the court’s effectiveness.119 Legitimacy increases
to the extent that constituencies think its decision-making is just and promotes
human rights protection. 120 Legitimacy also depends on the court’s
transparency and accountability, as well as the participation of various
parties.121 The sense of local ownership in terms of sovereignty, victims’
participation, community outreach, and participation of local judge,
prosecutors, and/or defense counsel is directly related to the legitimacy
issue.122
Effectiveness
Legitimacy and effectiveness are closely linked: “Legitimacy can help a
court to be more effective, and effective court may be considered more
legitimate . . . . [J]udicial illegitimacy can produce ineffectiveness and vice
versa.” 123 Effectiveness refers to a court’s goal, achievement, and
compliance with the ruling of the court.124 Most importantly, a court should
be able achieve its goals of prosecuting and meting punishment to the key
perpetrators. 125 A court’s goals may also include the development of the
judiciary system and human rights norms of the affected society.126 For the
sake of future Korea, the selected court should be able to effectively prosecute
responsible individuals and redress victims. 127 It should also positively
impact, rather than impede, peace and reconciliation.128

116. Id. at 51.
117. Shany, supra note 110, at 370; see Mani, supra note 110, at 256; see also Turns, supra note
110, at 129, 132.
118. Langvatn & Squatrito, supra note 115, at 51, 52.
119. BASSIOUNI & ROTHENBERG, supra note 3, at 10; Shany, supra note 110, at 370.
120. Cohen et al., supra note 113, at 12.
121. Andreas Follesdal, Constitutional, Not Democratization: How to Assess the Legitimacy of
International Courts, in LEGITIMACY AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS 307, 309 (Nienke Grossman et al.
eds., 2018).
122. BASSIOUNI & ROTHENBERG, supra note 3, at 11, 24, 53, 58.
123. Cohen et al., supra note 112, at 14.
124. Shany, supra note 110, at 361.
125. BASSIOUNI & ROTHENBERG, supra note 3, at 7, 34.
126. Id. at 2, 6, 9.
127. Detailed Findings, supra note 74, at ¶ 1220(p).
128. Id. at ¶¶ 1222, 1225(j).
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The operating language of the court is an important characteristic that
affects the court’s effectiveness and efficiency. 129 Both oral and written
communications play major roles throughout the court proceedings, from
hearing cases to rendering judgments. 130 First is the necessary internal
communications between judges and staff; second, interactions between the
court and the parties coming before it; and third, the court’s communication
with the larger public, including publication of judgments.131 The language
of the court varies according to court setting and there is a different effect on
each level of communication.132
Efficiency
The high cost of transitional justice imposes a constraint on the
transitioning government’s choice of transitional justice mechanisms. 133
Holding trials entails a significant financial burden for transitioning countries
and even for the international community that supports their operation.134
Added to cost of holding trials is the payroll for judges, prosecutors, many
investigators, and interpreters, along with accommodations for defendants
and protection for witnesses.135 The cost-efficiency of two ad hoc tribunals,
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), are criticized by
international society because of their large expenditures, which make the
international community reluctant to establish more ad hoc tribunals in favor
of experimenting with hybrid courts or internationalized domestic courts.136
In their ten years of operation, the ICTY spent US $1.2 billion dollars and the
ICTR spent US $1 billion dollars.137 The average cost per accused is US $1015 million dollars, 138 which the author Bassiouni deems “hardly
acceptable.” 139 The operation of the ICC is lower than that of an ad hoc
tribunal, but the cost is still high; its budget for 2009, during which the court
129. See Mani, supra note 110, at 257.
130. See Harry Hobbs, Hybrid Tribunals and the Composition of the Court: In Search of
Sociological Legitimacy, 16 CHI. J. INT’L L. 482, 517 (2016).
131. Language and International Courts, 2009 BRANDEIS INST. FOR INT’L JUDGES 1, 1 (2009).
132. Id. at 2, 3.
133. See Mani, supra note 110, at 256.
134. Id. at 257.
135. See David Wippman, The Cost of International Justice, 100 Am. J. Int’l L. 861, 865-66, 870,
871 (2006).
136. Rupert Skilbeck, Finding Justice: The Price of War Crimes Trials, 15 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 1, 10
(2008).
137. Id. at 6.
138. Id.
139. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Reflections on Contemporary Developments in International Criminal
Justice, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 409, 416 (Bartram S. Brown ed.,
2011).
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covered four cases,140 was US $130 million dollars.141 The budgets of hybrid
courts are far lower than those of purely international courts, but vary widely
among courts. 142 The expenditures of the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) are surprisingly high, the cost being US $300
million dollars during its 11 years of operation.143 The ECCC achieved only
three convictions as of 2017, and incurred criticism for inefficiency.144 The
Special Panels for Serious Crimes in the District Court of Dili (SPSC)
operates on a limited budget 145 having a US $6.3 million dollar budget
allocated in 2002, but there are concerns raised about its achievement.146 The
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) spent US $ 708,000 thousand dollars
per trial in 2006.147
Olsen et al. investigated the relationship between countries’ income
levels and transitional justice choices,148 finding that high-income countries
tend to choose trials, medium-income countries tend to choose truth
commissions, and low-income countries tend to have amnesties or no
transitional justice mechanism, that is, de facto amnesties.149 Thus, expected
economic and resource costs are a realistic consideration in deciding on
accountability mechanisms.150 The choice often reflects not only ability, but
also willingness to pay. 151 When the cost issue is the ability to pay, the
international community often becomes involved by sharing the financial
burden or sometimes by leading the transitional justice mechanism.152
The cost-efficiency is not only a matter of financial economy, but is also
a matter of time-effectiveness.153 Redressing injustice and bringing justice
on time is also an interest of transitional justice.154 Scrutinizing the cases and
revealing the truth is an important merit of the court, but if a certain type of
accountability option is expected to cost more time and resources it would
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. AARON FICHTELBERG, HYBRID TRIBUNALS: A COMPARATIVE EXAMINATION 31 (2015).
143. Seth Mydans, 11 Years, $300 Million and 3 Convictions. Was the Khmer Rouge Tribunal Worth
It?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/world/asia/cambodia-khmerrouge-united-nations-tribunal.html.
144. Id.
145. FICHTELBERG, supra note 142, at 65.
146. Till Skrobek, Confronting the Past – The Difficult Road to Accountability in East Timor, 2
SÜDOSTASIEN AKTUELL 26, 31 (2005).
147. Skilbeck, supra note 136, at 8.
148. TRICIA D. OLSEN ET AL., TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN BALANCE: COMPARING PROCESSES,
WEIGHING EFFICACY 61 (2010).
149. Id. at 73.
150. Id. at 64.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 62.
153. OLSEN ET AL., supra note 148, at 106.
154. Laurel E. Fletcher et al. Context, Timing and the Dynamics of Transitional Justice: A Historical
Perspective, 31 HUM. RTS. Q.163, 206
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affect the choice of criminal justice measure.155 The two ad hoc trials, ICTY
and ICTR, are criticized in this regard as their lack of cost-efficiency makes
them a less preferable option of the international community.156 When it
takes an inefficient, long time to establish an accountability measure or
rendering a decision on the case, it causes a delayed justice problem from the
victims’ perspective and also causes a bigger financial burden to support the
time-consuming legal process.157 From the perspective of the accused, this
delay impedes his or her right to speedy trial.158
Practicality
Other aspects that must be taken into consideration are the actual
practicality of establishing certain criminal justice institutions or the
implementation of available options in particular cases.159 There are different
legal, political, social, and economic obstacles in applying or creating such a
targeted system. 160 Because the circumstances surrounding transitioning
countries and their relationship to international treaties are all different,
assessments of the practicality of various criminal justice options are also
different.161 No matter how good a system is, it is not worth discussing if it
cannot actually be used.
4.2. Context of Transition
4.2.1. Context of Transition in Institutional and Organizational
Choice
In making the choice of which criminal justice option to use, those
making that choice should consider the given country’s circumstances and
context.162 States which are experiencing political transition vary according
to the nature of the conflict generating the crimes, the structure of the
institution overseeing the transition, the form of transition, the political
environment, and the economic and social environment.163 There are primary
transitional justice measures and tools to respond to serious human rights

155. OLSEN ET AL., supra note 148, at 16.
156. Ralph Zacklin, The Failings of Ad Hoc International Tribunals, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 541,
545 (2004).
157. Id. at 543-44.
158. Id. at 543.
159. See Turns, supra note 110, at 125-26, 126.
160. Id. at 126.
161. Id. at 133-34.
162. Milena Sterio, The Future of Ad Hoc Tribunals: An Assessment of Their Utility Post-ICC, 19
ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 237, 249 (2013).
163. Id. at 242, 250.
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violations, but there is no one answer that fits every transitioning country.164
In other words, there is no perfect universal mechanism.165 Therefore, when
selecting measures of transitional justice, the particular context should be
carefully considered.166 The context of the conflict, institutional oversight,
local culture and politics, and the economic structure of the transitioning
society are all important. 167 The institutional context is important when
selecting, designing, implementing, and assessing transitional justice policies
and processes.168
In this regard, Bassiouni explains that in deciding the most appropriate
accountability measure, the following factors should be evaluated
individually and collectively, and none of the factors should be excluded.169
A. The gravity of the violation: for example, is it a jus cogens violation?
(genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes);
B. The extent and severity of the victimization;
C. The number of the accused;
D. Those who are the accused (e.g., the senior architect, low-level
executor, bureaucrat);
E. The extent to which both sides are equally committed to international
criminal standards;
F. The current government is the violator regime still in power either de
jure or de facto?;
G. The competence and independence of the domestic judiciary;
H. The evidentiary issues;
I. The extent to which the conflict or violations have subsided;
J. Cultural concerns or “the will” of the community;
K. Nature of the conflict: international or internal armed conflict, or
repressive regime.170
After evaluating these factors, Bassiouni argues, the selection of an
accountability mechanism “must be made in good faith in order to achieve a
just result and should be transparent and justifiable.”171 Further, Bassiouni
emphasized that this selection “must be acceptable to the victims” and also to

164. Dickinson, supra note 26, at 310.
165. Sarah M. H. Nouwen, Hybrid courts – The Hybrid Category of a New Type of International
Crimes Courts, 2 UTRECHT L. REV. 190, 214(2006).
166. Id.
167. See Roger Duthie, Introduction to JUSTICE MOSAICS: HOW CONTEXT SHAPES TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE IN FRACTURED SOCIETIES 9, 9 (Roger Duthie & Paual Seils eds., 2017).
168. Id. at 14.
169. See Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 41.
170. Id. at 41-42.
171. Id. at 42.
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interested states, as well as satisfactory to international civil society by
meeting international legal norms.172
4.2.2. Envisaging the Context of Transition of Future Korea
While the scale of human rights violations in North Korea is identified as
an important context, until the transition comes, it cannot be known what
other contexts should be taken into account in selecting criminal justice
options for a future Korea. Even so, the purpose of this paper is to be prepared
for the chance to respond to calls for criminal justice by envisaging a future
post-conflict justice setting for Korea. Therefore, in the next sections, this
article proposes a few elements of a hypothetical situation in order to provide
a plausible scenario as the essential context in which to evaluate and suggest
particular options for the selection of criminal justice measures.
Broadly speaking, in the future there can be (1) internal-transition of
North Korea, (2) reunification of North and South Korea, or (3) no transition
at all. An internal political transition in North Korea could provide a chance
for transitional justice.173 The changes in leadership may result in agreement
to adopt international criminal justice, or people may stage a coup or
revolutionary uprising and demand democratic reforms.174 There is pervasive
surveillance of North Korean people and a high level of blind loyalty to the
regime, but North Korean refugees testify there is also a great discontent with
the regime on account of its reign of terror and poverty.175 In the case of such
an uprising domestic courts, preferably assisted by the international
community, mixed courts, a foreign country’s domestic court, or a separate
international court all might be a venue for criminal justice.176
The reunification of North and South Korea is also a possibility.177 The
form of reunification and the distribution of power between the North and
South Korean governments may vary.178 Setting aside such variation, this
article assumes that the unified government establishes a democratic
environment and rule of law corresponding to South Korea’s current judicial
system in this hypothetical situation. This situation is proposed because
172. Id.
173. See Andrew G. Reiter, External Actos and Transitional Justice in a Reunified Korea, in
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN UNIFIED KOREA, 35, 41 (Back Buhm-Suk & Ruti G. Teitel eds., 2015).
174. Id.
175. Detailed Findings, supra note 74, at ¶¶ 1213, 1214.
176. See Dickinson, supra note 26, at 309.
177. See Reiter, supra note 173, at 35; see also Baek Buhm-Suk et al., Transitional Justice in PostUnification Korea: Challenges and Prospects, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN UNIFIED KOREA 11, 11 (Baek
Buhm-Suk &Ruti G. Teitel eds., 2015); Constantin Goschler, German Reunification and the Challenge of
Transitional Justice, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN UNIFIED KOREA 123, 132 (Baek Buhm-Suk &Ruti G.
Teitel eds., 2015);
178. Goschler, supra note 177, at 132.
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reunification of the two Koreas is not only a feasible transition in the Korean
peninsula, but also offers the most viable chance to seek criminal
accountability. As a matter of fact, the idea of reunification was discussed
over decades between the two Koreas.179 Each Korea’s general conception
of the other is unique, but features the usual sentiments often found in other
conflict cases of the world. The particular sentiment of hope for peaceful
reunification arises from the history of the division of the two Koreas, which
neither North nor South Koreans willed. 180 This common ground for
reunification is clearly expressed in both countries’ constitutions.181 Also,
the past reveals quite a few cooperative exchanges to reach the common goal
of peaceful reunification between North and South Korea.182
The transition scenarios proposed may sound ambitious; however,
without transition internal criminal justice options conforming to
international human rights principles are hardly imaginable in what is
currently North Korea.
Of course, there could be no transition at all and criminal justice pursued
in the status quo. The current standoff in the Korean peninsula stands firm
and human rights violations widespread, as has been the case for a long
179. See Victor D. Cha, Korean Unification: the Zero-sum Past and the Precarious Future, 21
ASIAN PERSP. 63, 65-69 (1997); GABRIEL JONSSON, TOWARDS KOREAN RECONCILIATION, 49, 72 (2006)
180. James A. foley, Korea’s Divided Families, 61, 63-64 (2003)
181. See DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] art. 4 (S. Kor.) (noting article 4
of South Korea’s constitution states that “[t]he Republic of Korea shall seek unification and shall formulate
and carry out a policy of peaceful unification based on the principles of freedom and democracy.”); see
also DPRK [CONSTITUTION] art. 9 (N. Kor. 1998) (indicating that North Korea’s constitution also states
in Article 9 that “the DPRK shall . . . reunify the country on the principle of independence, peaceful
reunification and great national unity.”).
182. See Adam de Bear, From Sunshine to Storm Clouds: An Examination of South Korea’s Policy
on North Korea, 23 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 823, 22, 26 (2015) (demonstrating that in 2000 and 2007,
leaders of two countries announced Joint Declaration reconfirm the will of the peaceful reunification and
economic cooperation in the inter-Korean summit). See Catherine Putz, Closing Kaesong: South Korea
Withdraws from Joint Industrial Park, THE DIPLOMAT (Feb. 11, 2016), https://thediplomat.com/2016/02/
closing-kaesong-south-korea-withdraws-from-joint-industrial-park/ (noting that the Gaeseong Industrial
Complex opened in Gaeseong, North Korea, as an inter-Korean economic cooperation between two
Koreas in 2004. More than a hundred South Korean firms hired about 54,000 North Korean laborers until
the operation halted in 2016). See Mount Geumgang tour project marks 10-year anniversary, HANKYOREK
(Nov. 18, 2008), http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/322443.html (noting that in
1998, Mt. Kumgang tourism began as an inter-Korean economic cooperation and over million South
Korean visited Mt. Kumgang in North Korea); In 2005, the Gaeseong Industrial Complex opened in
Gaeseong, North Korea, as an inter-Korean economic cooperation between two Koreas as well. More than
a hundred South Korean firms hired about 54,000 North Korean laborers until the operation halted in 2016;
see also Motoko Rich, Olympics Open With Koreas Marching Together, Offering Hope For Peace, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/world/asia/olympics-opening.html
(describing that in 2018 winter Olympics in South Korea, there was a joint parade of North and South
Korea under one Korean peninsula flag). See 2018 SOUTH-NORTH KOREA SUMMIT, 17-18,
https://issuu.com/kocis9/docs/2018_inter-korean_summit_presskit__ (last visited Mar. 19, 2019)
(indicating that there were dialogue and exchanges from 1970s between two Korea, including the very
first inter-Korean summit in 2000 of Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong Il and the second summit in 2007 of
Roh Moo-hyun and Kim Jong il which were stepping stones of the two inter-Korean Summits in 2018.)
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time. 183 Given the repressive regime, its surveillance of people, and the
strong punishment imposed on political offenders, the status quo may be
continued and the international community may decide to implement
international criminal justice anyway. 184 The international community’s
current discussion of criminal justice is primarily based on the current
situation.185 At the same time, it recognizes that those options take time to
materialize and does not totally discount the possibility of sudden political
change.186 In the status quo, pursuing criminal justice in a foreign country’s
domestic court may be possible, including South Korean leading criminal
justice. With South Korea’s participation, a new form of mixed setting in
South Korea or in a foreign country may be possible. International court
options, either by using the ICC or by establishing an ad hoc court may also
be a possibility the international community pursues. However, without any
transition in North Korea, the international court option may not be feasible
in the current Security Council's composition and political environment.187
There are also legal obstacles to bringing perpetrators to court if they are
traveling outside of North Korea.188 These political and legal obstacles are
discussed later in this article. With a limitation in the status quo, only partial
accountability and justice can be achieved. 189 Seeking only partial
accountability is likely to have a very minimal effect on the people in North
Korea and human rights victims, neither enhancing human rights condition
nor preventing recurrences. 190 If we only take account of the status quo,
pursuing domestic, mixed options, or local justice with North Korean
government’s involvement does not have enough merit to be examined.
This being said, in light of the purpose of this paper to analyze and
suggest a best-suited criminal justice organization and institution for a future
Korea in the post-conflict justice setting in the event of transition, the
following analysis is not only based on status quo but also considers the two
hypothetical transition situations in Korea.
5. ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE OPTIONS FOR FUTURE KOREA
This section provides a comprehensive analysis of each criminal justice
options’ characteristics and application of such options to the known context
of human rights violations and the hypothetical context of a future Korea to
183. See Buhm-Suk et al., supra note 177, at 19.
184. Id. at 17, 19.
185. Id. at 19.
186. Reiter, supra note 173, at 40; Promoting accountability in the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea, ¶46, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/40/36 (Mar. 7, 2019).
187. Buhm-Suk et al., supra note 177, at 21.
188. See Morse H. Tan, Finding a Forum for North Korea, 65 SMU L. REV. 765, 785 (2012).
189. Id. at 790-91, 808.
190. Id. at 790-91, 807.
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determine what form best suits future Korean society. In the practice of
transitional justice, there are five different settings of judicial proceedings.191
The first category comprises international tribunals to deal with specific
cases.192 Starting with the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, the ICTY and
ICTR were created to deal with specific human rights issues within a specific
time and regional context.193 Later, to have a permanent judicial body to deal
with the most serious human rights and humanitarian law violations came the
creation of the ICC, making it possible to seek individuals’ accountability for
international crimes within larger territorial jurisdictions, and this body
constitutes the second category of criminal justice option.194 The third is a
“mixed” or “hybrid” model, which combines international and domestic
courts.195 The fourth option is using domestic courts without international
involvement in delivering the criminal justice.196 Under the domestic court
option, a domestic court of a foreign country can also be a venue for criminal
justice.197 The fifth option, a local or traditional justice process, is applied as
an informal judicial body when it is a more effective tool to bring justice and
reconciliation.198 The next part of this article preliminarily examines the five
different criminal justice options, the ICC, an ad hoc tribunal, a mixed
tribunal, domestic courts, and local justice, in that order.
5.1. International Criminal Court (ICC)
International community members and Korean scholars actively discuss
the option of referring the leadership of North Korea to the ICC. 199
Considering the seriousness of the human rights abuses in North Korea, the
international community recognizes the possibility of the ICC prosecuting
North Korea’s case.200 However, the court’s legitimate jurisdiction will limit
prosecution by the ICC.201 The ICC has jurisdiction over a State’s case under
the following circumstances: the State is a member to the Rome Statute, the
191. See Dickinson, supra note 26, at 295.
192. Id.
193. See Michael Humphrey, International Intervention, Justice and National Reconciliation: The
Role of the ICTY and ICTR in Bosnia and Rwanda, 2 J. HUM. RTS. 495, 495 (2003).
194. See Jennifer Elsea, International Criminal Court: Overview and Selected Legal Issues, 4
(2002).
195. See Dickinson, supra note 26, at 295.
196. Id. at 300.
197. Id. at 297.
198. See Lars Waldorf, Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice as Transitional
Justice, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2006).
199. See generally, Grace M. Kang, A case for the Prosecution of Kim Jong Il for Crimes Against
Humanity, Genocide, and War Crimes, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 51 (2006); Patricia Goedde, Legal
Mobilization for Human Rights Protection in North Korea: Furthering Discourse or Discord, 32 HUM.
RTS. Q. 530, 554 (2010); Tan, supra note 188, at 767-68.
200. G.A. Res. 73/180, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. A/RES/73/180 (Jan. 23, 2019)
201. Rome Statute, supra note 51, at art. 5.
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State accepts the ICC’s jurisdiction over it, or the UN Security Council refers
the case to the ICC. 202 North Korea is not a member state of the Rome
Statute.203 There is almost no possibility that North Korea will voluntarily
accept the ICC’s jurisdiction due to possible prosecution of their current
regime.204 Therefore, the ICC may exercise its jurisdiction over North Korea
if the UN Security Council refers the North Korea case to the ICC using its
power under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 205 However, scholars have
criticized the feasibility of using the ICC to deal with North Korea case.206
Even though the international community currently puts emphasis on using
the ICC to deal with the North Korea case, the role of the UN Security
Council is absolutely crucial to referring the case to the ICC.207 Although
most of the UN Security Council member states agree on referring the North
Korea case to the ICC, China and Russia, two longstanding allies of North
Korea and who have veto power over the Security Council’s decisions,208
oppose this plan with the argument that the Security Council should deal with
matters of international peace and security, not human rights issues.209 As
long as China and Russia are likely to use veto power, the ICC option is not
considered realistic at this stage. 210 These two countries’ attitudes may
change at the time of transition, but for now they are obstacles in the way of
the Security Council referring North Korea to the ICC. 211 In 2014, the
Security Council agreed to discuss North Korea’s human rights issue;
however, the Security Council took no steps to refer the case to the ICC
because of China and Russia’s opposition. 212 This example shows the
apparent, current impracticality of the ICC option.
The ICC also has a limitation on its temporal jurisdiction.213 The ICC
has temporal jurisdiction over the violations committed after July 1, 2002, the
date of the entry into force of the Rome Statute.214 The history of operating

202. Id. at arts. 11, 12, 13.
203. Detailed Findings, supra note 74, at ¶ 1195.
204. Id. at 73.
205. Rome Statute, supra note 51, at art. 13.
206. Tan, supra note 188, at 798-99.
207. Milena Sterio, Seeking the Best Forum to Prosecute International War Crimes: Proposed
Paradigms and Solutions, 18 FLA. J. INT’L L. 887, 887 (2006); Detailed Findings, supra note 74, at ¶ 1201
208. Louis Charbonneau, China, Russia Opposes U.N. Council Meeting on North Korea, REUTERS
(Dec. 8, 2015, 12:17 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-rights-un/china-russia-opposeu-n-council-meeting-on-north-korea-idUSKBN0TR01X20151208.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Rome Statute, supra note 51, at art. 11.
214. Id.
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political camps in North Korea goes back to the 1950s.215 Thus, the ICC
cannot prosecute those who are responsible for human rights violations under
Kim Il-Sung’s and most of Kim Jong-Il’s regime.216 However, the ICC may
exercise its temporal jurisdiction over several cases in which North Korea
abducted people from South Korea, Japan, and other countries before 2002,
as these are considered continuing crimes.217
The ICC also has a fixed subject matter jurisdiction, meaning that it
cannot hear cases not related to certain crimes listed in the Rome Statute,
which include: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of
aggression.218 Thus, the ICC may be a venue for high-profile cases, but it
cannot deal with other human rights violations not listed in the Rome
Statute.219 Different from the ICC, ad hoc tribunals or mixed tribunals can
extend their subject matter jurisdiction.220 So, in North Korea’s case, the ICC
may only be suited for four of the listed crimes.221
Further, the ICC is a complementary jurisdiction with a national judicial
system. 222 Because of the ICC’s national complementarity, if a domestic
court prosecutes the case, the ICC will not hear the case.223 The Rome Statute
Article 17 grants the ICC jurisdiction when the domestic court system is
unwilling or unable to carry out the criminal justice task.224 The potential
lack of intention or capacity to investigate or prosecute serious human rights
violations by a future Korean government would justify the ICC’s
intervention.225 Priority of jurisdiction will be given to the domestic court
(which will be the successive Korean government of North Korea in a
reunification scenario) so long as the ICC assesses the successive
government’s capacity and/or willingness as insufficient.226 Priority could
also be given to the affected State instead of international proceedings in
order to rebuild the capacity of the State and restore civic trust in the national
institution.227
One other practical problem with the ICC is that, because it takes on
various cases in different countries, it cannot handle a large number of human
rights violation cases of one State at a time, but is best suited to take on only
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Detailed Findings, supra note 74, at ¶ 116.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 72-73.
Rome Statute, supra note 51, at art. 5.
See Sterio, supra note 162, at 249.
Id. at 248.
Rome Statute, supra note 51, at art. 5.
Tan, supra note 188, at 784.
RENEE JEFFERY, AMNESTIES, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 148 (2014).
Rome Statute, supra note 51, at art. 17.
Id.
Id.
Tan, supra note 188, at 789.
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the most serious cases.228 In this regard, the complementary roles of the ICC
share criminal accountability to take the most serious cases and the national
or ad hoc tribunals take the rest of the cases.229
Overall, compared to other options, referring a case to the international
court will diminish sovereignty, victim’s participation, community outreach,
and/or development of the country. 230 There will be less sense of local
ownership if the ICC leads the procedures and participates as staff,
prosecutors, or judges than if trials take place at the domestic level. 231
Because of the geographical distance between the court and the site of the
case, access to the crime scene and the participation of victims, witnesses,
and the public will be limited.232 The outreach of the court to the community
to investigate, tell the truth, and restore civil society will also be limited due
to its distance.233 The ICC may not take sufficient account of local needs.234
Witness protection may be a problem.235 Also, different operating languages
may require extensive use of interpreters, which can impede speedy trial,
increase costs, and risk misinterpretation. 236 Additionally, the language
barrier may decrease domestic attention and domestic media may have
inadequate access to the international court, both resulting in an
understanding gap between the local population and the international criminal
procedures.237 As an international court, it has more difficulty understanding
the context and cultural aspects of the transition than do domestic-based
models.238
The ICC’s primary purpose is to seek accountability, not serve the needs
of the society affected by the atrocities.239 The goal of the ICC is to promote
international justice rather than one state’s reconciliation or smooth
transition.240 The needs of each society and its preferred ways of ensuring
accountability are associated with its cultural and historical background.241
Thus, because of its international focus, the ICC may not sufficiently address
228. Sterio, supra note 162, at 239.
229. JEFFERY, supra note 223, at 148; Rome Statue, supra note 51, at art. 17; Tan, supra note 188,
at 784.
230. Tan, supra note 188, at 785-789.
231. Id. at 787.
232. Id. at 783.
233. Id. at 800.
234. Id. at 768.
235. Id. at 807-08.
236. Stuart Ford, Complexity and Efficiency at International Criminal Courts, 29 EMORY INT’L L.
REV. 1, 46, 49
237. Sterio, supra note 207, at 897.
238. Christian M. De Vos, Investigating from Afar: The ICC’s Evidence Problem, 26 LJIL 1009,
1010 (2013).
239. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, https://www.icc-cpi.int/about (last visited Nov. 27, 2018).
240. Id.
241. Tan, supra note 188, at 786.

Published by DigitalCommons@ONU, 2018

25

Ohio Northern University Law Review, Vol. 45 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 12

94

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

each country’s specific needs, which can cause unintended side effects.242 In
fact, scholars have criticized the ICC’s involvement for aggravating ethnic
conflict and violence and in this way impeding peace.243
Another foundational criticism of the ICC and internationalized criminal
justice is levied by realists stating that the court is not free from international
politics.244 As I mentioned above, the Security Council’s role is critical in
implementing international criminal justice by exercising exclusive power to
decide what matters threaten international peace and authorize criminal
justice action.245 However, the Security Council’s response to atrocities in
the world are selective and not free from political motivation.246 Its neglect
of certain atrocities for example, in Syria, Ukraine, Somalia, and Sri Lanka,
but its intervention in other cases such as Libya, Rwanda, and former
Yugoslavia, clearly shows the Security Council’s biased selection.247 Boas
and Chifflet, arguing that from the international criminal justice perspective
no conflict situation is any less morally deserving of intervention than any
other, contend that political realities constrain the Security Council from fully
meeting its purpose of maintaining international peace and security by
limiting its response.248 When justice procedures are led solely by outside
actors, the procedures are not free from the impact of international politics,
the victor’s justice problems, or even westernized justice problems.249
However, there are also benefits in using international courts.250 The
primary strengths of choosing the ICC option lie in using well-devised
judicial proceeding and international criminal law expertise.251 Compared to
mixed courts, the ICC has a long legacy and standing in dealing with
international crimes.252 The legitimacy of the court and the crimes will not
face debate as much as the other cases because the authority of international
community already established the definition of crimes.253 Also, the ICC can
independently decide the cases apart from domestic politics.254
In terms of cost, using the ICC will be less expensive than creating a
separate tribunal, and the ICC will reduce the time spent because it is using
242. Id. at 799.
243. Sterio, supra note 162, at 240
244. GIDEON BOAS & PASCALE CHIFFLET, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 60 (2017).
245. Id. at 70.
246. Id. at 73.
247. Id. at 70-71.
248. Id. at 73.
249. BOAS & CHIFFLET, supra note 244, at 92.
250. Tan, supra note 188, at 783.
251. Sterio, supra note 162, at 238.
252. Id. at 248.
253. Rome Statute, supra note 51, at art. 5.
254. Tan, supra note 188, at 803. (pointing out that a previous pure domestic trial was vulnerable to
political interference); De Vos, supra note 238, at 1010.
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existing resources.255 Because the prosecution take place in the ICC, attention
of major world-wide media and international society can be guaranteed.256
International publication of court documents of the investigation including
evidence, testimonies, and rulings will alert a wider audience throughout the
world to the atrocities.257 To consider an important purpose of transitional
justice, prevention, the use of English or French as an international language
will warn potential perpetrators in other countries. 258 The archived
documents will also contribute to post-conflict and human rights studies.259
The well-developed procedures of the ICC also places the victim’s
perspective at the forefront and can award restitution to victims from funds
under its structure.260 Its complementarity to the domestic prosecution may
be used positively when the domestic institution is ineffective or
unavailable.261
5.2. Ad hoc Tribunals
An ad hoc tribunal, or a special tribunal, is created to deal with certain
regions or events only at an international level.262 The ad hoc tribunal option
is recommended by the COI and the Group of Independent Experts on
Accountability to deliberate criminal justice for North Korea’s human rights
situation. 263 Different from the ICC, it is free from temporal jurisdiction
limitations, however officials can set a temporal jurisdiction which will
enable the court to deal with the long-term human rights abuses in North
Korea’s history.264 The court can be specifically designed to concentrate on
North Korea and the UN can provide sufficient personnel and material
resources to carry out its task.265
However, in last two decades’ questions concerning the efficiency of the
ICTY’s and ICTR’s operation of ad hoc tribunals emerged from the
international community. 266 They need separate buildings, staff, and
detention facilities, which require larger budgets than domestic or ICC

255. Id. at 806, 808.
256. Sterio, supra note 207, at 903.
257. Tan, supra note 188, at 783.
258. Id. at 803.
259. Sterio, supra note 162, at 247.
260. Anne Dutton & Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Between Reparations and Repair: Assessing the Work of
the ICC Trust Fund for Victims under Its Assistance Mandate, 19 CHI. J. INT’L L. 490, 493 (2019).
261. BOAS & CHIFFLET, supra note 244, at 226.
262. Ad Hoc Tribunal, BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (Desk ed. 2012).
263. Detailed Findings, supra note 74, at ¶ 1218; Rep. of the Grp. Of Indep., supra note 91, at ¶ 84.
264. Sterio, supra note 162, at 238.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 239.
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options.267 The time from the creation of an ad hoc tribunal to the actual
prosecution and sentencing is longer than that of any other option. 268 It
results in more expenses and possibly impairs the rights of alleged perpetrator
to speedy trial. 269 Thus, the trial may take so long to eventually achieve
justice that some victims may not live long enough to see the results.270 The
UN COI report, recognizing this problem when suggesting an ad hoc
international tribunal as an alternative to the ICC, states that the ad hoc
tribunal for North Korea “would require substantial resource commitments
and institutional planning, leading to a further delay in bringing perpetrators
to justice.”271
Furthermore, as an international tribunal, the ad hoc tribunal option raises
the same concerns as using the ICC.272 Because the court will use English
and French as an official international language, many interpretations and
double documentations will be necessary at every stage of the court
proceedings. 273 Misunderstandings from faulty translations or lack of
cultural understanding may cause unnecessary delays. 274 In addition, the
attention of the international community is not guaranteed.275 For example,
in the case of an ICTR court established in a country far from the reach of
international media, the court procedures and outcomes received less
international attention.276
Local ownership over the criminal accountability procedures will also be
questioned.277 The venue will still be outside of the country, which limits
victim participation, community outreach, and investigation of the crime
scene.278 This option may deprive the country of the chance to re-establish
rule of law by transitional justice and restore justice to the victims and
community.279 The ad hoc tribunal may focus on and achieve the goal of
criminal prosecution independently from domestic politics, but the victor’s
justice can be an issue when the international society establishes the court to
punish the leaders of North Korea without the initiative of the citizens.280
267. Philippe Kirsch, The International Criminal Court: A New and Necessary Institution Meriting
Continued International Support, 28 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 292, 293 (2005).
268. Tan, supra note 188, at 765.
269. Id. at 806.
270. Id.
271. Detailed Findings, supra note 74, at ¶ 1201.
272. Tan, supra note 188, at 803.
273. Id.
274. Danielle Tarin, Note, Prosecuting Saddam and Bungling Transitional Justice in Iraq, 45 VA.
J. INT’L L. 467, 515 (2005).
275. Kirsch, supra note 267, at 293
276. Tan, supra note 188, at 799-800.
277. Tarin, supra note 274, at 512-13.
278. GIRELLI, supra note 54, at 158; Tan, supra note 188, at 805.
279. Sterio, supra note 207, at 890; Tan, supra note 188, at 789-90.
280. Tarin, supra note 274, at 514.
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Rather, if future Korea has the willingness and capacity to carry the task, a
complementary arrangement is preferable to establish the court completely at
the international level.281
With regard to the establishment of the court, the UN Security Council
takes the same conclusive role as when the UN Security Council refers a case
to the ICC.282 The power to establish an ad hoc tribunal comes from UN
Charter Chapter VII, which establishes the UN Security Council’s power to
decide measures to maintain or restore international peace and security.283
The consensus required to create the ad hoc tribunal needs China’s and
Russia’s votes as well, and as noted, these two countries’ objections are
highly predictable.284
There are arguments for the alternative of establishing an ad hoc tribunal
through the UN General Assembly.285 The COI report also notes that the UN
General Assembly may establish an ad hoc tribunal; the report refers to the
UN’s residual power to unite for peace in association with member states’
sovereign power according to universal jurisdiction on crimes against
humanity.286 This view is based on the example of the General Assembly’s
establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia by
resolution. 287 But North Korea’s and Cambodia’s cases are different. In
Cambodia’s case, the Cambodian government initially sought international
cooperation and the Chambers were established as a domestic court first and
secondarily as an agreement with United Nations.288 The Cambodian case
hardly seems to have established an ad hoc tribunal by a General Assembly
resolution.289 Without the North Korean government’s request, this option
cannot be an alternative to the ICC option, nor can it avoid the veto power
problem in the UN Security Council. 290 One could argue that General
Assembly could also establish an ad hoc tribunal by using the power granted
in Article 22 of the UN Charter.291 Those who insist on the establishment
through the General Assembly refer to Article 22, which states, “[t]he
281. Tan, supra note 188, at 784.
282. U.N. Charter art. 39.
283. Id.
284. Charbonneau, supra note 208.
285. Detailed Findings, supra note 74, at ¶ 1201.
286. Id.
287. Tan, supra note 188, at 800.
288. Tanaz Moghadam, Revitalizing Universal Jurisdiction: Lessons from Hybrid Tribunals
Applied to the Case of Hissene Habre, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 471, 493 (2008).
289. Id.
290. Chandra Lehka Sriram, Wrong-Sizing International Justice - The Hybrid Tribunal in Sierra
Leone, 29
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 472, 474 (2006).
291. Derek Jinks, Does the U.N. General Assembly have the authority to establish an International
Criminal Tribunal for Syria? JUST SECURITY (May 22, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/10721/u-ngeneral-assembly-authority-establish-international-criminal-tribunal-syria/.
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General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems
necessary for the performance of its functions.”292 However, this argument
lacks a proper legal basis because the ICJ concluded that Article 22 does not
grant the General Assembly the power to establish a judicial body governing
external matters.293
Nevertheless, despite questions regarding its establishment and
efficiency, an ad hoc tribunal, one of the preferable options for thoroughly
investigating the atrocities, effectively seeks accountability, and assures that
the international community will prevent reoccurrence.294 This explains why
the COI and the Group of Independent Experts on Accountability recommend
one.295
5.3. Mixed Tribunals
The mixed or hybrid tribunal is a cooperative form of international and
domestic court.296 Dickinson defines hybrid courts as “both the institutional
apparatus and the applicable law consist of a blend of the international and
the domestic.”297 They are also called internationalized-domestic courts.298
This model is suited for pursuing the goals of both international justice and
domestic growth. 299 As the latest court model to deal with international
crime, the international community enthusiastically welcomes the mixed
model as an alternative to ad hoc tribunals.300 It is expected to have both the
benefits of international tribunals and domestic courts while mitigating the
problems of purely international justice or purely local justice.301 Examples
of the mixed model are the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in the
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Tarin, supra note 274, at 512.
295. Detailed Findings, supra note 74, at ¶ 1201.
296. See FICHTELBERG, supra note 142, at vii.
297. See Dickinson, supra note 26, at 296.
298. Michael P. Scharf, Saddam Hussein on Trial: What Went Awry? The Iraqi High Tribunal: A
Viable Experiment in International Justice?, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 258, 259 (2007). There are views to
differentiate hybrid tribunals and internationalized-domestic courts when the domestic court is not newly
created with international composition but is only supported by international community. See Sterio, supra
note 162, at 245. Sterio analyzes hybrid tribunals and internationally-supported domestic chambers in
different categories. Id. at 244. In his analysis, the Iraqi Special Court, the Bosnian War Chamber, Somali,
Kenya, Seychelles cases are considered internationally-supported domestic chambers. Id. In this case, the
judges and the source of law are domestic, but they have support from the international community by
training the court’s personnel, employing international staff, or through monetary contribution. See id. at
245.
299. Sterio, supra note 162, at 240.
300. See Nouwen, supra note 165, at 190.
301. Id.

https://digitalcommons.onu.edu/onu_law_review/vol45/iss1/12

30

Kang: Speculations on Criminal Justice Mechanisms to Address the North

2019] SPECULATIONS ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE MECHANISMS

99

District Court of Dili (SPSC), and the Regulation 64 Panels in the Courts of
Kosovo.302
Both State governments and the international community comprise the
court and share the monetary burden and the duty to prosecute.303 The mixed
court setting helps integrate the perspectives of an international court and
domestic court. 304 Foreign judges and domestic judges sit on the court
together, and both the prosecution and defence include international and
domestic lawyers.305 For the international actors, the collaboration with local
actors enhances their understanding of local issues, culture, and approaches
to justice beyond what they would gain in a purely international court.306 The
court uses local judicial principles together with international standards, and
its location within the country facilitates investigation and community
outreach without geographical restraints.307 The mixed model has strength in
its capacity and time-effectiveness.308 It can handle both low-profile cases
and a larger amount of cases than the ICC, which can only handle a limited
number of cases.309 In this regard, the mixed model can, in a sense augment,
the ICC’s prosecution by undertaking low-profile cases and providing a
forum sooner than the ICC’s operation can.310
The mixed model also has strength in “legitimacy, capacity [building],
and norm-penetration.” 311 The legitimacy problems of international and
domestic courts are not at a theoretical level, but at a practical one.312 When
the domestic court pursues criminal prosecution of past regimes’ personnel,
people may feel it is a political action to purge political opponents of the new
regime and regard the prosecution as selective and incomplete if every human
rights violator is not prosecuted.313 In contrast, a purely international tribunal
may face great hardship in establishing local legitimacy, especially with the
society to which the accused belongs.314 Thus, by gaining legitimacy for its
impartiality, the mixed model fosters broader local acceptance. 315 By
appointing international and domestic judges together to assure independence
of the judiciary, the mixed model is especially beneficial when cases are
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

FICHTELBERG, supra note 142, at vii; Nouwen, supra note 165, at 192.
See Tan, supra note 188, at 765-66.
See Dickinson, supra note 26, at 295.
Id.
Id. at 307.
Id. at 295, 307.
Id. at 307, 308.
See Dickinson, supra note 26, at 308, 309.
Id. at 308, 309.
Id. at 306.
Id. at 301.
Id.
Dickinson, supra note 26, at 303.
See Tan, supra note 188, at 802.
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highly sensitive.316 In cases where the local population is divided, a mixed
composition of judges may have the best chance of securing broad support.317
In either hypothetical transition, future Korea is expected to face problems of
division between perpetrators and victims, between regime supporters and socalled traitors among North Koreans, and between North and South
Koreans. 318 The mixed model is an option to ensure legitimacy and
acceptability to a larger group of people.319
The mixed model can also positively affect the local capacity building.320
Contrary to the goals of transitional justice, a purely international court does
not effectively support local capacity building.321 A post-conflict society may
lose monetary resources, physical infrastructure, and human resources due to
purification during the transition.322 A purely international court, established
outside of the post-conflict State with foreign staff, has little chance of
establishing the needed institutions and training of local people for capacity
building.323 On the other hand, a purely domestic institution in the difficult
process of transition may not have enough resources to fulfill its objectives.324
However, a mixed model can provide teamwork for training personnel and
developing local infrastructure. 325 Considering North Korea’s needs for
capacity building and its lack of resources in transition, the mixed model will
be more beneficial than other options.326
Neither a purely domestic nor a purely international court can be fully
effective in penetrating the norms of international human rights law and
international criminal law.327 In the time of transition, understanding and
implementing human rights standards to deal with mass atrocities is
important.328 However, the local court may not be familiar with international
standards and tend to refer to its domestic standards and criminal law to
prosecute perpetrators.329 On the other hand, a purely international court will
have well-established and understood international norms, but may have little

316. Dickinson, supra note 26, at 306.
317. Id. (explaining how the division between Serbians and ethnic Albanians created difficulties in
trying cases, but the verdicts of the hybrid courts were supported).
318. See Buhm-Suk et al., supra note 177, at 23; Tan, supra note 188, at 784-85, 790, 795, 804.
319. See, e.g., Dickinson, supra note 26, at 306, 308.
320. Id. at 307, 308.
321. Id. at 303.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 303, 304.
324. Dickinson, supra note 26, at 304.
325. Id. at 307.
326. See Tan, supra note 188, at 802 (discussing that a hybrid system would increase the long-term
capacity building of the judicial system).
327. Dickinson, supra note 26, at 300.
328. Id. at 295.
329. Id. at 305.
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impact on the local penetration of those norms.330 The mixed model would
mitigate these problems and facilitate penetration of norms at both levels
through networks linking international legal scholars and domestic actors.331
As shown in the Sierra Leone case, the mixed model also promotes domestic
and regional human rights. 332 South Korea produced several recognized
International Criminal Court judges who are familiar with international
human rights and international criminal law.333 However, in North Korea’s
case, dissemination of human rights norms is one of the primary and
indispensable goals of transitional justice.334
The mixed model also has a positive impact on circumventing and
overturning amnesties.335 The statute and rulings of domestic-international
mixed tribunals (the SCSL, the SPSC, and the ECCC) are strongly against
granting amnesty for serious crimes.336 For example, the SCSL declared that
amnesty given for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other violations
of the Geneva convention will not bar the SCSL’s prosecution.337 The ECCC
not only prohibited a request for amnesty from the Cambodian government,
but also has the power to decide on amnesty that is already granted.338
Nevertheless, the hybrid setting may create difficulties in communication
and disagreements in judgment.339 The hybrid setting requires working in
330. Id.
331. Id. at 307.
332. Dickinson, supra note 26, at 299, 300; See Tan, supra note 188, at 784.
333. See Judge Sang-Hyun Song, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtStructure/Pages/
judge.aspx?name=Judge%20Sang-Hyun%20Song (last visited February 9, 2019); Judge Chang-ho
Chung, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtStructure/Pages/judge.aspx?name=Judge%20Chan
g-ho%20Chung (last visited February 9, 2019) ; The Bureau recommends Mr. O-Gon Kwon (Republic of
Korea) for President of the Assembly for the next triennium, ASSEMBLY OF STATES PARTIES.,
https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/press%20releases/Pages/PR1318.aspx (last visited February 9,
2019); Judge Baik Kang Jin, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA,
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/person/judge-baik-kang-jin (last visited February 9, 2019).
334. See Tan, supra note 188, at 767-68, 811; Dickinson, supra note 26, at 295, 307.
335. See JEFFERY, supra note 223, at 169.
336. Id. at 154, 155-56, 157.
337. Id. at 154; Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., App, II, at art
10, U.N. Doc. S/2002/246 (2002).
338. Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, as amended and
promulgated on Oct. 27, 2004, art. 40 (NS/RKM/1004/006).
The law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in Cambodia stated that:
[t]he Royal Government of Cambodia shall not request an amnesty or pardon for any persons
who may be investigated for or convicted of crimes referred to in Articles 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of
this law. The scope of any amnesty or pardon that may have been granted prior to the enactment
of this Law is a matter to be decided by the Extraordinary Chambers.
Id.; JEFFERY, supra note 223, at 155-56.
339. See Hanna Bertelman, International Standards and National Ownership – Judicial
Independence in Hybrid Courts: The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 79 NORDIC J.
INT’L L. 341, 365 (2010); See Tan, supra note 188, at 803.
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several different languages and mitigating different interpretations of the
law.340 The hybrid court will still have the problem of victor’s justice if it
excludes the participation of certain local groups and works only to recognize
victims and designate reparations.341 The ownership problem also arises in a
mixed model.342 Even though the court is established by both international
and domestic authority, the question of who has more or dominant control
can create controversy. 343 When the international community has more
control, the process may seem tainted by imperialism or victor’s justice.344
On the contrary, when the domestic actors have more control, this can raise
questions of “independence and impartiality.”345
Establishing a mixed court requires either a request or agreement by the
State in question or an action by UN Security Council.346 It also requires the
same legal basis as other international courts to justify infringement on the
State’s judicial sovereignty. 347 In this regard, a mixed model often faces
resistance and pressure from the two establishing parties: the domestic
government and the international community or foreign government.348
Because it is hard to envisage having the consent from the DPRK in
current setting, the Commission of Inquiry dismissed this option.349 Adding
to this, the lack of impartiality and independence of the judges of the DPRK
would likely impair the hybrid mechanism.350 In that regard, the Group of
Independent Experts points that it is necessary to have complete internal
reform of the DPRK’s justice system before establishing a hybrid
mechanism.351 The Group of Independent Experts further notes that a hybrid
court led by other domestic jurisdictions is one to be considered but it has
potential legitimacy concerns. 352 With internal reform in the DPRK or
broader transition of two Koreas as provided in the transition scenarios,
carrying out criminal prosecution through a mixed court will have a great
potential to benefit and nourish society in capacity building, and will have
power to ensure accountability which comes from the stronger legitimacy.
340. See Tan, supra note 188, at 803; See also Hobbs, supra note 130, at 488, 515 (2016). Hobbs
suggests consisting of a hybrid court with international judges who share the same legal tradition and speak
a common language as a pragmatic consideration.
341. See Bertelman, supra note 339, at 380-382; Tan, supra note 188, at 807.
342. See Nouwen, supra note 165, at 198-99.
343. See Dickinson, supra note 26, at 306.
344. Id.; see Tan, supra 188, at 766, 809.
345. Dickinson, supra note 26, at 306.
346. See Nouwen, supra note 165, at 199, 201
347. Id. at 201.
348. See FICHTELBERG, supra note 142, at 1-2.
349. Detailed Findings, supra note 74, at ¶ 1202; Rep. of the Grp. Of Indep., supra note 91, at ¶ 55.
350. Id.
351. Rep. of the Grp. Of Indep., supra note 91, at ¶ 55.
352. Id. at ¶ 57.
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5.4. Domestic Courts
5.4.1. Domestic Prosecution in Korea
Criminal prosecution in a domestic court is a matter of sovereignty.353
People want to have control over serious crimes that have affected their
society and bring offenders to justice by their own hand. 354 Exercising
criminal jurisdiction and executing police power is the State’s sovereign
power over its land, which the State is reluctant to give up. 355 Domestic
prosecutions in transitional justice can achieve the broader goal of transitional
justice to rebuild the society and reconstruct its institutions. 356 Holding
domestic proceedings helps to restore civic trust in the national institutions
which previously failed to protect people from the atrocities.357
Prosecutions in domestic courts dealing with past human rights violations
are considered to have a greater positive impact on the society than cases of
internationally led prosecution. 358 The participants in the domestic court
proceedings are familiar with the law, languages, and the environment of the
local setting.359 The participation of victims and witnesses is facilitated, as
better access to the court is guaranteed.360 The public pays attention to the
court procedures through the news media and direct observation.361 Thus, the
domestic court option maximizes the educational impact on the society.362 It
is also an efficient option in terms of both time and financial costs, as having
better access to victims and crime scenes and little or no need for multiple
operating languages leads to a quicker and cheaper trial.363 Using the existing
judiciary system also reduces costs and saves time, and as noted, public
participation is more encouraged than in any other settings.364 Thus, when
the domestic government has the willingness and capacity, it should lead the
criminal justice proceedings.365

353. See generally Mark S. Ellis, The International Criminal Court and Its Implication for Domestic
Law and National Capacity Building, 15 FLA. J. INT’L L. 215, 223 (2002).
354. See Turns, supra note 110, at 129. (explaining States have the greatest and most immediate
interest in trying offenders).
355. See id. at 167.
356. See Sterio, supra note 207, at 904.
357. Id.
358. See Dickinson, supra note 26, at 304, 305 (explaining where international courts are used there
is little done to build local capacity and few opportunities for both domestic legal professionals and the
public to use, develop, reject, or understand the international jurisprudence).
359. See Tan, supra 188, at 802.
360. See Sterio, supra note 207, at 904.
361. See Tarin, supra note 274, at 519.
362. Id.
363. See id. at 515.
364. Tarin, supra note 274, at 515; Kirsch, supra note 267, at 293 (2005).
365. Sterio, supra note 207, at 903.
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However, a domestic prosecution is not the best option when the society
in transition lacks the will to deal with its past or the ability to carry the court
procedures. 366 Also, if the officials of the institutions such as judges,
prosecutors, and the police have previously functioned as enforcers and
perpetrators of the former regime, they are not suitable agents to carry out
criminal accountability. 367 Without international involvement, domestic
courts are more prone to corruption compared to other options. 368 For
sensitive cases in which the perpetrators and victims belong to the same
society, a domestic court also may not effectively conduct the case with
legitimacy and fair debates.369 If the society is divided and the proceeding is
led by one side, justice for victims may be problematic and political
controversies may result. 370 For the human rights victims of the North
Korean regime, while holding local ownership over accountability and
restoring trust in national institutions is important, a local court may not be a
viable option as its experience with the judiciary and police power suggests
the accused group’s involvement.371
Because it is hard to separate the North Korean regime’s human rights
violations from the North Korean judicial branch, their participation may
impair the criminal justice outcome and the public may not accept their
participation.372 In this regard, the Group of Independent Experts dismissed
the idea of involving North Korea or its justice personnel.373 In designing a
transitional justice plan, the lustration issue of the North Korean regime
should be seriously considered, and it should prohibit the participation of
North Korea’s former officers in the judicial system. 374 Moreover, only
North Korean led criminal accountability will face a problem in ensuring

366. See Gilbert Bitti & Mohamed M. El Zeidy, The Katanga Trial Chamber Decision: Selected
Issues, 23 LJIL 319, 320 (2010) The ICC Trial Chamber decided Katanga’s case is admissible before the
ICC because the DRC was unwilling to conduct proceedings against Katanga; See also supra note 207, at
903-04.(discussing where countries have the will and ability to prosecute, national courts should be
allowed to prosecute).
367. Dickinson, supra note 26, at 301.
368. See Sterio, supra note 162, at 249.
369. See Dickinson, supra note 26, at 301.
370. See Tarin, supra note 274, at 518.
371. See Robert Collins & Amanda M. Oh, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, From
Cradle to Grave 20-21(2017) (explaining judicial actors and law enforcement institutions’ role in
supporting dictatorship and control people in North Korea); See also Dickinson, supra note 26, at 302
(indicating that Kosovo and East Timor demonstrate where the justice system has previously been run by
oppressors – there is the undermining of public confidence and legitimacy of local courts); Tan, supra note
188, at 768 (discussing the importance of both providing local population with a sense of justice and
healing when considering the type of prosecution for North Korea).
372. Tan, supra note 188, at 792-93, 795-96.
373. Rep. of the Grp. Of Indep., supra note 91, at ¶ 73.
374. See Buhm-Suk et al., supra note 177, at 24; see also Tan, supra 188, at 792-93.
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adequate human resources and conformity with international human rights
standards.375
In the case of South Korean led procedures, the capacity is not in
question. 376 If the reunification takes place, it is highly likely that South
Korea’s developed judicial system will be adopted.377 The South Korean
government consistently puts efforts into preparing for possible reunification,
including plans for integration of the legal system and criminal
prosecution.378 The South Korean government recently adopted the North
Korean Human Rights Act to preserve the evidence of human rights
violations in North Korea, and judicial branches have started a discussion of
ways to deal with transitional justice issues in the future.379 The experience
of judges and scholars in South Korea with several international tribunals
allow them to bring lessons from the international judicial system and
international standards into the domestic systems. 380 However, if the
transitional justice court is composed only of South Koreans, it can be seen
as victor’s justice and fairness can be questioned.381 The exclusion of North
Koreans may result in lack of sovereignty of North Korean citizens.382
5.4.2. Universal Jurisdiction Cases in Foreign Domestic Courts
Jus cogens crimes are subject to universal jurisdiction, which means
foreign countries can prosecute those crimes in their domestic courts.383 A
notable example is the Pinochet case, in which the Spanish national court
exercised its universal jurisdiction over Augusto Pinochet of Chile under
Spanish law.384 By exercising universal jurisdiction, any foreign country may
prosecute perpetrators regardless of where the crime happens or the
nationality of victims or perpetrators.385 Traditional jurisdiction assumes that
the state should have a nexus to the relevant party, but universal jurisdiction
does not require this nexus.386 The Rome Statute of the ICC also notes that

375. Tan, supra note 188, at 773, 774-75 (explaining North Korea has an inadequate judicial system
and infrastructure and that North Korean judges would be too biased to serve).
376. Id. at 789.
377. Id. at 772.
378. Id. at 771, 772, 777.
379. See Gregory Ulferts & Terry L. Howard, North Korean Human Rights Abuses and Their
Consequences, 13 N. KOR. REV. 84, 88 (2017).
380. See Song, supra note 333.
381. Tan, supra 188, at 809-10.
382. Tarin, supra note 274, at 518.
383. Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 33-4; Madeline H. Morris, Universal Jurisdiction in a Divided
World: Conference Remarks, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 337, 337 (2000); Tan, supra note 188, at 788.
384. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Precedent and Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 311, 311 (2000).
385. See Morris, supra note 383, at 337.
386. BOAS & CHIFFLET, supra note 244, at 77.
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“it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those
responsible for international crimes.”387
A foreign country’s recognition of universal jurisdiction contributes to
assuring that accountability is sought and sends a warning to potential
perpetrators.388 It is also an effective tool to circumvent and overturn blanket
amnesties granted to the perpetrator by a domestic institution.389 The foreign
country’s efforts to seek accountability under the universal jurisdiction
principle also inspires the country and civil society affected directly by the
atrocity to seek accountability and circumvent the existing amnesty.390 The
international crimes that draw universal jurisdiction are understood to include
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, torture, piracy, and
slavery. 391 Because the victims of crimes against humanity by the North
Korean regime includes foreigners, mostly abductees from Japan, China, and
other countries, those foreign countries may exercise their jurisdiction over
the perpetrators.392
However, the use of universal jurisdiction is rare and limited by legal,
political, and practical obstacles.393 The Group of Independent Experts also
points out that prosecution in South Korea, Japan or China may face those
challenges. 394 Politically, foreign countries are often reluctant to use
universal jurisdiction that may disrupt an amicable relationship.395 There are
political pressures against using universal jurisdiction from allies.396 Other
problems include politically and morally justifying involvement with the
country’s own people and persuading them to agree on unanticipated
expenditures incurred by exercising universal jurisdiction.397
387. Rome Statute, supra note 51, at pmbl.; see also JEFFERY, supra note 223, at 148.
388. See Morris, supra 383, at 338, 354.
389. JEFFERY, supra note 223, at 136-37.
390. See generally id. at 146-47 (explaining Chile’s efforts to circumvent amnesty laws after the
Pinochet case).
391. BOAS & CHIFFLET, supra note 244, at 77; GIDEON BOAS, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CONTEMPORARY PRINCIPLES AND PERSPECTIVES 263 (2012).
392. See Greg Scarlatoiu, Peace, Unity, and Justice for All: Problems and Prospects of Transitional
Justice in a Reunified Korea, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN UNIFIED KOREA 93, 96, 97 (Baek Buhm-Suk
& Ruti Teitel eds., 2015). The Group of Independent Experts also lists South Korea, Japan, and China as
other domestic legal systems that may offer “some legal bases for criminal investigations and prosecution
of crimes committed in North Korea”. See Rep. of the Grp. Of Indep., supra note 91, at ¶ 75.
393. BOAS & CHIFFLET, supra note 244, at 78.
394. See Rep. of the Grp. Of Indep., supra note 91, at ¶ 75.
395. Karinne Coombes, Universal Jurisdiction: A Means to End Impunity or a Threat to Friendly
International Relations, 43 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 419, 453 (2011) (explaining concern on exercising
universal jurisdiction may hinder international relations.)
396. Human Rights Watch, Belgium: Universal Jurisdiction Law Repealed (Aug. 1, 2004),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2003/08/01/belgium-universal-jurisdiction-law-repealed (last visited Feb. 9,
2019)
397. See Maximo Langer, Universal Jurisdiction is Not Disappearing: The Shift from ‘Global
Enforcer’ to ‘No Safe Haven’ Universal Jurisdiction, 13 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 245, 252 (2015); See Morris,
supra note 383, at 339.
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The legal obstacles include the following: (1) to exercise universal
jurisdiction, individual states need to adapt it to the domestic legislative
system and create a legal basis of authority, and (2) the exercise of universal
jurisdiction may be limited by the doctrine of diplomatic immunity where
certain foreign government officials are immune from foreign jurisdiction.398
Therefore, in the case of North Korea, the domestic courts of foreign
countries seeking to deal with North Korea’s situation need to first recognize
universal jurisdiction in their domestic legislative system, and they may not
be able to exercise jurisdiction as long as the criminals holds a diplomatic
position.399
Another practical obstacle is the difficulty of actual enforcement. 400
Universal jurisdiction does not allow the country to encroach on another
country’s sovereign jurisdiction.401 In the Pinochet case, the actual arrest
could happen when he was traveling outside of his home country.402 Thus, to
physically gain custody the accused, the foreign prosecuting country needs
the cooperation of the country where the accused is located.403 If the other
country does not agree on extradition, or the accused has the country’s
protection, actual enforcement is impossible.404
5.5. Local/Traditional Justice
Indigenous or informal tradition-based measures for administering
justice or settling disputes can be adopted in a post-conflict setting either
under or separately from the domestic court.405 A good example of adopting
a localized forum for justice is the Rwandan Gacaca courts.406 To address
the Genocide atrocity, the Gacaca courts provided informal court settings
where perpetrators and victims could sit together to acknowledge the truth
and forgive.407 A lay judge adjudicated cases, and perpetrators often received
community sentences. 408 The court focused on restorative justice to
overcome racial conflict and dealt with the reality that an ordinary judiciary
system could not handle more than 100,000 perpetrators effectively. 409
398. BOAS & CHIFFLET, supra note 244, at 78-79 (explaining the ICJ denied Belgium court’s
exercise of universal jurisdiction to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic
of the Congo, Yerodia in the Arrest Warrant case in 2011 based on the doctrine of diplomatic immunity).
399. See id.
400. Id. at 80.
401. Id. at 81.
402. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 384, at 311.
403. See BOAS & CHIFFLET, supra note 244, at 80-81.
404. Id.
405. See Sharp, supra note 24, at 143.
406. Id. at 148.
407. BOAS & CHIFFLET, supra note 244, at 66.
408. Id.
409. Id.; see Sharp, supra 24, at 149.
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Despite the courts’ problems of inconsistency, ineffectiveness, and
questionable legitimacy, they facilitated local participation and were largely
embraced by the community.410
The Chicago Principles assert, “States should support and respect
traditional, indigenous, and religious approaches regarding past violations”411
because these approaches are already integrated into the society and have
high levels of local legitimacy. 412 Through the lens of the international
community, concepts such as “justice,” “injustice,” and “victim” are specific
tools used to address the legacies of human rights abuse in transitional
justice.413 “Transitional justice solutions” are formed and imposed upon the
local society exogenously.414 The local population may resist this outside
implementation of justice, viewing it as illegitimate, making it unlikely to be
successful in the long term.415 In designing transitional justice, it is important
to make a sincere effort to understand and respect local preferences and
values. 416 Rather than globalized or westernized concepts of transitional
justice, there is increasing interest in the possibility of adopting traditional
justice as a transitional justice modality.417 The Chicago Principles also state
that local and traditional justice agents should respect due process and human
rights guidelines, just as the global approach to justice should respect local
and less formal justice processes.418 The Chicago Principles recognize the
international human rights perspective, the values of traditional justice, and
the importance of balancing traditional processes of justice with due process
and other human rights principles.419
South Korea’s judicial system is based on a western model, so there is no
significant traditional justice procedure to consider. 420 North Korea’s
situation is similar, but because North Korea is a totalitarian State there is
strong centralized control.421 In North Korea’s case, the “Review Meeting of
410. BOAS & CHIFFLET, supra note 244, at 66.
411. BASSIOUNI & ROTHENBERG, supra note 3, at 54.
412. Id.
413. See Sharp, supra 24, at 142.
414. Id.
415. Dickinson, supra note 26, at 302, 303.
416. See Sharp, supra 24, at 142; The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General: The Rule
of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict societies, ¶¶ 16, 17, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616
(Aug. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Report of the Secretary-General].
417. See generally Ray Nickson & John Braithwaite, Deeper, Broader, Longer Transitional Justice,
11 EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 445, 447 (2014).
418. BASSIOUNI & ROTHENBERG, supra note 3, at 55.
419. Id. at 54, 55.
420. National
Court
Administration,
Supreme
Court
of
Korea
(2018),
http://file.scourt.go.kr//AttachDownload?file=2018_Introductory_Book_of_the_Supreme_Court_of_Kor
ea.pdf&path=009&downFile=2018_Introductory_Book_of_the_Supreme_Court_of_Korea.pdf.
421. See Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, NORTH KOREA: A COUNTRY STUDY 8991 (Robert L. Worden ed., 2008).
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Party Life” may be viewed as a kind of local justice system, in which smaller
groups meet to self-examine and criticize each other.422 However, this tool
has been implemented by the central government to promote the power of the
North Korean regime and maintain mutual surveillance among citizens rather
than promote justice. 423 In the future, Korea should be vigilant to avoid
establishing a similar process in either a reunification scenario or an internal
transition scenario. However, religious accountability and reconciliation may
be considered as tools to respect authentic community-based justice
procedures. 424 Considering the large number of perpetrators who directly
violate human rights or are collaborators of the regime, and the immensity of
the reconciliation task in future Korea, alternative restorative justice
measures such as the Gacaca courts ought to be considered.
6. BEST-SUITED CRIMINAL JUSTICE OPTIONS FOR FUTURE KOREA
Different considerations come into play when choosing the setting of
criminal justice measures to meet the goals of the transitioning country. Each
option, whether the ICC, ad hoc, mixed, domestic, or local courts, have
different merits and weaknesses. 425 Preferences can change at times
according to the nature of reunification, resources, the succeeding
government, the needs of the public, and the international community’s
intentions.426 Future Korea should consider these elements along with each
court’s characteristics. It is crucial to thoroughly review these factors and try
to minimize the weaknesses of any chosen option while fulfilling the people’s
desire for criminal justice and respecting the needs of victims in the
application of justice.427
Based on the analysis provided above of the different criminal
accountability options, the mixed model, or use of complementary court
options, is the best model for future Korea. The court’s location inside the
Korean peninsula facilitates investigation and community outreach.428 It also
gives strength to its time-effectiveness and capacity to handle a large number
of cases.429 The mixed model strengthens legitimacy as well, so it is more
acceptable to the divided society and promotes local ownership. 430 The
benefit of capacity building and norm penetration helps a future Korea to
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. See Sharp, supra 24, at 157-158.
425. See BASSIOUNI & ROTHENBERG, supra note 3, at 29-30.
426. Id. at 11 (explaining the many considerations that go into deciding which transitional justice
structure is best).
427. Id. at 10.
428. See Tan, supra note 188, at 799-800, 804.
429. Id. at 804.
430. Id.
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move to a different trajectory. The international component that circumvents
amnesty ensures accountability and justice. The multilingual operation may
give wide publicity to the local and international community.431 However,
future Korea must put efforts into overcoming and heading off the
weaknesses of the mixed model in communication, sovereignty, and
impartiality.
Another positive factor of mixed courts is that there is no standard design,
but the pattern can transform to meet specific needs of the transitioning State.
For example, the Kosovo Specialist Chamber is a mixed court adopting the
domestic court system, but no domestic judges are presiding.432 The chamber
is a regional-domestic form, which is mainly supported and organized by the
EU. 433 A recent hybrid court, the Extraordinary African Chambers in
Senegal, is an internationalized model under a foreign domestic court to deal
with crimes in Chad supported by a regional organization, the African
Union.434
Complementarity also adds flexibility and capacity to criminal justice
options.435 It allows the ICC to adjudicate the most serious cases and the
domestic courts or mixed courts perhaps to deal with smaller cases.436 The
future Korea will have the capacity to deal with human rights violations in its
domestic court.437 It is a cost and time-efficient option which maximizes the
local impact of criminal justice.438 In this way, the domestic court can allow
the ICC to try the high-profile cases independently and try mid-level cases
itself. Also, the caseload burden is shared to facilitate the criminal justice
process. Having an international or internationalized court together benefits
Korean society and helps to accomplish an effective reconciliation of North
and South Korea. The mixed model can be adopted along with the
international court, or with purely domestic procedures. 439 As Dickinson
points out, a mixed model is not a complete substitute for either international
or domestic courts, but it should be understood as a complement to both.440
Both international and domestic court systems can function as “mutually
supportive forums of justice,” and the choice of forum is decided by

431. See id. at 803.
432. Robert Muharremi, The Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office,
HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L., 967, 967, 981 (2016).
433. Id. at 973.
434. See Sarah Williams, The Extraordinary African Chambers in the Senegalese Courts: An
African Solution to an African Problem, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1139, 1140 (2013).
435. See Dickinson, supra note 26, at 310.
436. Id. at 308.
437. See Tan, supra note 188, at 793.
438. Id. at 765.
439. See Dickinson, supra note 26, at 310.
440. Id.
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comparing the advantages of each option.441 This approach entails not only
the burden of choosing more specialized options, but the effort to share the
burden and achieve justice together. For a future of proper justice, Korea
needs the wisdom and flexibility to use more than one option to meet its
various needs in criminal justice.
Further, there is also no singular answer to the issue of selecting or
creating criminal accountability measures. 442 Just as ad hoc tribunal and
mixed models developed, an innovative new model can be created in the
future to minimize the weaknesses and maximize the strengths of current
models. 443 Also, criminal accountability measures often fail to focus on
victims or meet their needs for truth-seeking. 444 Criminal accountability
measures are not designed for effective response to mass atrocities or to
provide redress for the suffering of victims.445 Therefore, the limitation in
criminal accountability mechanisms calls for measures other than transitional
justice.446 Truth commissions and other non-retributive justice measures are
considered alternative justice mechanisms.447 Combinations of transitional
justice mechanisms are more effective to secure democracy and human rights
than relying on only one mechanism.448 Combining a truth commission, trial,
and amnesty can produce the most effective outcomes.449 Bassiouni notes
that a combination of at least two mechanisms is necessary to respond to longlasting and large-scale victimization.450 By using different mechanisms as
may be appropriate, transitional justice can meet various needs by finding the
truth, prosecuting perpetrators, restoring victims’ rights, providing amnesty,
and reconciling the society.451
These mechanisms do not have to be used simultaneously, but can be
activated sequentially or in response to specific situations.452 They can also
be linked so that one mechanism’s operation can accommodate the next
mechanism, or they can be complementary to each other.453 Thus, future
Korea should facilitate cooperation among different mechanisms, such as
441. Carsten Stahn, Complementarity: A Tale of Two Notions, 19 CRIM. L. F. 87, 91, 93, 94 (2008).
442. See Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 41.
443. See Dickinson, supra note 26, at 310.
444. See Brianne McGonigle Leyh, Nuremberg’s Legacy within Transitional Justice: Prosecutions
Are Here to Stay, 15 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 559, 568 (2016).
445. See id.
446. Nickson & Braithwaite, supra note 417, at 447.
447. See id. at 459.
448. See Sharp, supra note 24, at 143.
449. See id. at 148-49.
450. See Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 42, 43.
451. Id. at 42.
452. See Dickinson, supra note 26, at 305-06 (explaining the different combinations of mechanisms
that can be used in response to different situations).
453. See Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 416, at ¶¶ 25, 26.
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providing information gathered from the truth commission to the court,
rotating use of staff in certain sectors, and dividing complex tasks. Such
cooperative measures can achieve cost efficiency while expeditiously
fulfilling the goals of transitional justice.
7. CONCLUSION
Bassiouni explains the importance of the criminal justice system in
transition stating:
Accountability and victim redress are also fundamental to postconflict justice, as the re-establishment of a fair and functioning
criminal justice system in the aftermath of conflicts is the only means
to avoid impunity and ensure a lasting peace, which only a viable
criminal justice system can protect and guarantee.454
He asserts that bringing perpetrators to justice is not only a duty, but also an
important tool to prevent future human rights atrocities.455
When considering transitional justice for North Korea’s egregious and
systematic human rights violations, one of the essential issues in transitional
justice is criminal accountability. International human rights norms mandate
a State to take reasonable steps to prosecute perpetrators of gross human
rights and humanitarian law violations. 456 Under the principles of
international law, impunity for serious crimes is prohibited.457 The judicial
process in transitional justice plays an important role in bringing justice to
society and to victims.458 Not only by rules but by principle, the international
community and victims’ groups demand criminal accountability. 459 The
Korean legal value placed on justice through court procedures also mandates
criminal proceedings to address human rights atrocities. 460 Therefore, a
preliminary inquiry should occur to consider the criminal accountability
option for future Korea.
To find out what form best suits future Korean society, the context at the
time of transition, the scale of human rights violations and the political and
454. See Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 54.
455. See id.
456. BASSIOUNI & ROTHENBERG, supra note 3, at 29.
457. Id. at 21.
458. Id. at 45.
459. Id. at 2.
460. See Sarah Son et al., Transitional Justice Working Group, Mapping Crimes Against Humanity
in North Korea, 51-52, https://www.tjwg.org/data/media/20170718170710.pdf (last visited Feb.7,
2019)(showing North Korean defectors have a strong preference for criminal prosecution and punishment
in court for perpetrators of human rights abuse); See also Kuk Cho, Transitional Justice in Korea: Legally
Coping with Past Wrongs after Democratization, 16 PAC. RIM L.& POL’Y J. 579, 581, 582
(2007)(explaining south Koreans strong demand of criminal prosecution in dealing with its past wrongs).
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economic capacity of the future transitioning society, are crucial
considerations. The characteristics of each criminal justice option,
legitimacy, effectiveness, efficiency, and practicality affect the decision.461
The Korean society’s willingness and ability to take the lead in the criminal
justice procedures, its willingness to have international involvement, and the
international community’s willingness to provide support also impact the
choice.462
It is impossible to presuppose every contextual factor and possible result
of each criminal justice option for future Korea.463 However, an inquiry into
criminal justice options cannot be put off, considering the international
community’s serious calls for concrete criminal accountability measures.464
The ongoing grave human rights violations urge the necessity of this inquiry
and demand the attention of international criminal law entities responsible for
the future investigation.465
This article concludes that among criminal justice options, the mixed
court or complementary court options using more than one court is best suited
to carry out future Korea’s transitional justice. It is true that transitional
justice is greatly affected by the critical choice of the institution best suited
to carry out the aspirations of a society.466 However, simply choosing the
“right” institution is not sufficient for achieving justice. The institution needs
to keep growing to reflect society’s changing beliefs and needs as truths are
unveiled.467 Institutions are not only chosen, but they also need to continue
maturing over time. Further, once the work of one institution such as a special
criminal tribunal is complete, a new institution to meet the next demand of
society is necessary. Throughout the whole process, as one transitional
justice task succeeds another, the process of choosing and designing the best
institution for that task should be repeated to meet all the society’s needs. As
noted above, so far, no empirical or comparative studies provide concrete
evidence of the different effects of criminal accountability measures and
factors that lead to satisfactory results.468 This paper is a mere preliminary
inquiry into criminal justice options for future Korea’s transitional justice. A
further institutional analysis will contribute to finding the best suited options
and ways to develop these options for future Korea.
461. See supra Section 4.1.
462. See BASSIOUNI & ROTHENBERG, supra note 3, at 25.
463. See id. at 7 (describing the difficulty of determining every contextual factor for each criminal
justice option).
464. G.A. Res. 73/180, supra note 200, at ¶ 12.
465. Id. at ¶¶ 19, 23.
466. See Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 41, 42 (showing the broad considerations that must be made
when choosing a transitional justice mechanism to carry out a society’s aspirations).
467. See BASSIOUNI & Rothenberg, supra note 3, at 10.
468. See supra Section 4.1.
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